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ABSTRACT
This paper theorizes a new discipline, comparative legal rhetoric,
which can accomplish two important goals. First, in a society broken down
by intractable polarization and win/lose dichotomies, comparative legal
rhetoric identifies alternative, nontraditional and non-Western ways to
communicate and persuade. How we talk is deeply connected to how we see
the world. If we take a break from the win/lose argument structure that
defines Western legal communication, we can uncover opportunities for
understanding and healing. Second, a study of comparative legal rhetoric can
generate cross-cultural understanding. This new discipline contains a trove
of knowledge about how persuasion works in different cultures. Comparative
legal rhetoric might also identify universal modes of persuasion, which would
be useful knowledge for any law advocate.
In Part One of the paper, I briefly explain why the comparative study
of legal rhetoric is important and how traditional legal rhetoric often fails to
achieve justice and equality.
In Part Two, I provide a foundational
introduction to the feeder disciplines that inform the new discipline of
comparative legal rhetoric––legal rhetoric, comparative law, comparative
rhetoric, and comparative cognitive psychology. Part Three explores lessons
that comparative legal rhetoric can teach, studying rhetorical practices
located outside of mainstream U.S. culture, including Navajo legal rhetoric,
Quaker rhetoric, restorative rhetoric, and citizen’s rhetoric. Studying and
applying these new communication processes can help solve disputes in a
way that fosters more empathy, equity, and justice.
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Comparative Legal Rhetoric

INTRODUCTION
“Long time no see.”1 This idiom perfectly captures the Covid-19
zeitgeist of social distance and isolation. Historically, how this phrase came
into U.S. parlance is unclear. One etymological theory is that the phrase is a
direct translation of the Mandarin Chinese phrase hǎojǐu bújiàn, which
literally translates to “long time no see.”2 The phrase must have made its way
into U.S. language as Chinese immigrants translated it to English. Although
this informal idiom is familiar to most Americans, it is unusual in its syntax.
Rather than emphasizing the subject, which is the norm for standard
American English, it retains a topical emphasis, which is more common in
Asian languages.3 “Long time no see” captures the essence of this paper,
which delves into critical but comparative approaches to language and culture
to theorize a new discipline, comparative legal rhetoric.
The other theory for “long time no see” is that it derives from an
indigenous greeting that author William F. Drannan overheard and found
humorous.4 In the early 1900s, Drannan wrote popular adventure tales, which
exoticized his experience with indigenous people on the U.S. frontier.5 This
particular explanation contains a troubling undercurrent, the idea that White
Americans popularized the “long time no see” idiom as a joke made at the
expense of indigenous persons.6 This anecdote surfaces another theme of this
paper, which considers the problematic ways that Western scholars have
compared different communication traditions and accordingly advocates for

1

Lakshmi Gandhi, Who First Said ‘Long Time, No See and in Which
Language?, Code Switch, NPR.ORG (March 9, 2014 7:05 PM ET),
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/03/09/288300303/who-firstsaid-long-time-no-see-and-in-which-language.
2
Id.
3
See supra notes 299-301 and surrounding text.
4
Gandi, supra note 1.
5
Gandi, supra note 1 citing William F. Drannan, Thirty-One Years on the
Plains and in the Mountains (Rhodes & McClure 1900).
6
Tanya Trusler, Is “Long Time No See” Offensive?, Inclusive and Exclusive
Language, ESL LIBRARY (December 6, 2018),
https://blog.esllibrary.com/2018/12/06/is-long-time-no-see-offensive/.
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a critical, self-reflexive comparison process that remains conscious of
colonial and racial power dynamics.7
This paper’s topic is timely. A comparative approach to legal rhetoric
has the potential to help people come together and heal. 2021 and 2021 has
been a time of disease, death, and division. Covid-19 kills all people, but the
disease has been particularly devastating to marginalized communities with
limited access to money, medicine, and a safe place to work. In addition,
people of color, including George Floyd, Ahmaud Arbery, and Breonna
Taylor, continue to be summarily gunned down with no one to answer for the
bloodshed. We live in a polarized landscape infected with fake news and
conspiracy theories, which teem in social-media echo chambers. On January
6, 2021, fomented by President Trump’s pugilistic rhetoric, a mob of people
stormed the Capitol in a frenzy, leaving five people dead. While big-tech
squelched some of the most toxic alt-right rhetoric circulating on social
media, the U.S. remains starkly divided. We have lost the ability to hear each
other, to really listen and understand, even if we do not agree.
Now, there seems to be a clarion call to identify, resist, abolish, and/or
repair all the institutional things that have brought us to this crisis moment.
The old ways aren’t working anymore. In several previous papers, I roundly
critiqued traditional Western legal rhetoric for being nonresponsive to the
needs of the people whose problems are being solved. I called for the
comparative study of legal rhetoric as a discipline that might bring healing to
our legal system. This paper moves from a negative moment of death and
despair to a theory of hope and repair.
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis asserts that patterns within a group’s
rhetoric shape that group’s perception of reality.8 Language does not just
voice an idea, it shapes an idea.9 If our rhetoric is not working well, what if
there are other rhetorics, operating using different patterns of speech and
thought, that could rejuvenate or renovate existing models (deductive logic,
adversarial process, black/white outcomes)? Learning, and potentially

7

See supra notes 49-62 and 201-238 and surrounding text.
Robert B. Kaplan, A Further Note on Contrastive Rhetoric, 24 COMMC’N
Q. 12, 12 (1976) (citing E. Sapir, The Status of Linguistics as a Science 5
LANGUAGE 207 (1929)) [hereinafter Kaplan, A Further Note on Contrastive
Rhetoric].
9
Id. (citing BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY
212-214 (M.I.T. Press 1956)).
8
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borrowing, from other rhetorical traditions might make the process of
persuasive communication more caring and responsive.
Building along these lines, this paper theorizes that the new discipline
of comparative legal rhetoric can accomplish two important goals. First, in a
society broken down by intractable polarization and win/lose dichotomies,
comparative legal rhetoric identifies alternative, non-traditional and nonWestern ways to communicate and persuade. How we talk is deeply
connected to how we see the world. If we take a break from the win/lose
argument structure that defines Western legal communication, we can
uncover opportunities for understanding and healing. Second, a study of
comparative legal rhetoric can generate cross-cultural understanding. This
new discipline contains of trove of knowledge about how persuasion works
in different cultures. Comparative legal rhetoric might also identify universal
modes of persuasion, which would be useful knowledge for any law
advocate.
Thematically, this paper sits within two disciplinary traditions––(1)
critical legal theories of society, race, gender, and other marginalized
identities; and (2) legal rhetoric. First, this is an unabashedly critical paper.
The old classical modes of persuasion (i.e. Aristotle’s syllogism) do not
always work.10 Deductive logic has been used to directly further social and
racial inequality,11 and more recently, to slow down or obstruct robust legal
remedies, animated by a progressive view of the collective good and aimed
at eradicating inequality, “root-and-branch.”12 I use the word critical in the
10

See infra, notes 21-28 and surrounding text.
See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). I discuss all of these
cases in my 2019 article, Does the Reasonable Man Have Obsessive
Compulsive Disorder? 54 WAKE FOREST LAW REV. 1049 (2019)
[hereinafter Jewel, Reasonable Man].
12
This point is most clearly illustrated in jurisprudence relating to
remedying racial discrimination in U.S. public schools. See Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (holding that busing was
necessary to eradicate racial discrimination “root and branch”). The root
and branch metaphor is telling. At this time, the Supreme Court was willing
to enforce robust remedies to excavate the deep-seated structures
responsible for race-based segregation in the U.S. public school system. In
the 1970s, however, the Supreme Court pivoted away from a rhizomatic
approach and began limiting the reach of federal remedies designed to
equalize the educational experience for children, regardless of race or class.
See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (holding that the Federal government
11
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way that Dr. Cornel West uses it, as a theory “begins with social structural
analyses [but] also makes explicit its moral and political aims.”13 I aim to
cultivate a critical “demystifying” approach to legal rhetoric that exposes “the
monolithic and homogeneous in the name of diversity, multiplicity, and
heterogeneity.”14
Second, this is a paper is written within the discipline of legal writing,
which is not often situated with critical theory. Critical theory, in particular
Critical Race Theory (CRT), became highly influential legal education in the
1980s and 1990s.15 CRT came about at a time in U.S. intellectual history
when there was a great debate over a Eurocentric approach to knowledge and
learning, when many scholars argued that knowledge must be diversified to
account for multiple cultural and racial perspectives.16 However, identitybased critique has not fully been embraced in the legal writing discipline in
part because legal writing has not long been recognized as a bona fide
discipline.17 This is because legal writing has long been relegated to the
realm of the non-doctrinal, non-substantive, and non-tenure-track, where

cannot remedy educational discrimination that derives from de facto, rather
than de jure causes) and San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that vast differences in public school funding that
correlated with the racial makeup of school districts did not raise an equal
protection violation because economic inequality does not create a suspect
class and education is not a fundamental right).
13
Cornel West, The New Cultural Politics of Difference, 53 THE
HUMANITIES AS SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY 93, 105 (1990).
14
Id.
15
See Lucille A. Jewel, Silencing Discipline in Legal Education, 49 TOL. L.
REV. 657, 666-67 (2018) (discussing critical identity centered legal
scholarship that emerged in the 1990s) [hereinafter Jewel, Silencing
Discipline].
16
LEE MORRISSEY, DEBATING THE CANON 1-2 (2005) (describing the 1990s
debate over what, if any, Western canonical texts should be studied in the
humanities).
17
There have been, however, a few powerful critical approaches to teaching
legal writing and legal rhetoric. See, e.g., Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is
Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law’s
Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7 (1998); Charles R.
Calleros, In the Spirit of Regina Austin’s Contextual Analysis: Exploring
Racial Context in Legal Method, Writing Assignments, and Scholarship, 34
THE J. MARSHALL L. REV. 281 (2000).
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teachers were not expected to engage in scholarship.18 Legal writing teachers
have not had the opportunity to engage in sharp and reflective critique in the
same way that other law teachers have.
Despite this hierarchy in legal education, over the past twenty years,
legal writing teachers and scholars have grown a discipline with its own
pedagogical and scholarly traditions.19 One of those traditions is a reverence
for classical, Western rhetorical forms.20 While the point of this paper is not
to dismantle and reject all forms of Western rhetoric and reasoning, I do argue
that legal writing needs to be diversified and infused with other valuable
approaches to reasoning and persuasion. This paper is a bird’s eye picture of
a new discipline that offers myriad avenues for scholarly inquiry. It assumes
that further research and writing will be undertaken to develop the discipline.
In Part One of the paper, I briefly explain why the study of legal
rhetoric is important and how traditional legal rhetoric often fails to achieve
justice and equality. In Part Two, I provide a foundational introduction to
the feeder disciplines that inform the new discipline of comparative legal
rhetoric––legal rhetoric, comparative law, comparative rhetoric, and
comparative cognitive psychology. Part Three explores lessons that
comparative legal rhetoric can teach, studying rhetorical practices located
outside of mainstream U.S. culture, including Navajo legal rhetoric, Quaker
rhetoric and process, restorative rhetoric, and citizen’s rhetoric. Studying and
applying these new communication processes can help solve disputes in a
way that fosters more empathy, equity, and justice.
I. Why Study Comparative Legal Rhetoric?
We should study comparative legal rhetoric because it has the
potential to repair traditional legal rhetoric, which contains toxic elements. In
Gut Renovations: Using Critical and Comparative Rhetoric to Remodel How
the Law Addresses Privilege and Power, my co-authors and I vigorously
argued that traditional legal rhetoric reproduces preexisting relations of
18

See generally, J. Lyn Entrikin et al., Treating Professionals
Professionally: Requiring Security of Position for All Skills-Focused
Faculty Under ABA Accreditation Standard 405(c) and Eliminating 405(d),
98 OREGON L. REV. 1 (2020).
19
Jewel, Silencing Discipline, supra note 15, at 680-81.
20
See generally, KRISTEN KONRAD ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR
LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS AND
PERSUASION (2009); Michael Frost, Introduction to Classical Legal
Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 613 (2013).
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inequality.21 Accordingly, traditional legal rhetoric should be subject to a
“gut renovation.”22 We argued that comparative legal rhetoric could be one
approach for remodeling the law.23 Traditional legal rhetoric uses deductive
reasoning, often cast in the form of a syllogism, resulting in an analysis that
tends to exclude context, especially context related structural forms of
inequality and marginalized identities based on race, ethnicity, gender, or
sexual orientation. Traditional legal rhetoric “descends from classical
Western rhetoric, formulated in ancient Greece and Rome, with Aristotle
being a predominant influencer.”24 In the U.S. legal system, traditional legal
rhetoric is generally rational, linear, logical, and dependent on clean-cut
categories.25 We attacked the sacred cow of Western rhetoric and the Western
concept of “reason,” pointing out that both Aristotle and Plato embraced
human hierarchy and inequality and approved of male domination, slavery,
and elitist governance norms.26 Both Aristotle and Plato believed that poor
people, working people, women, and enslaved people did not have the
requisite cognitive ability to engage in civic governance.27 We then
connected Greek notions of rhetoric and reason to the baldly racist notions
21

Elizabeth Berenguer, Lucille A. Jewel, and Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Gut
Renovations: Using Critical and Comparative Rhetoric to Remodel How the
Law Addresses Privilege and Power, 23 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 205 (2020)
[Hereinafter Berenguer et al., Gut Renovations]; Jewel, Reasonable Man,
supra note 11; Mary Campbell and Lucille A. Jewel, Death in the Shadows,
16
HASTINGS J. OF RACE & POVERTY 157 (2019); [hereinafter Campbell &
Jewel, Death in the Shadows]; Lucille A. Jewel, Neuro-Rhetoric, The Law,
and Race: Toxic Neural Pathways and Healing Alternatives, 76 UNIV. OF
MARYLAND L. REV. 663 (2017) [hereinafter Jewel, Neuro-Rhetoric, Race,
and the Law]; Lucille A. Jewel, Old School Rhetoric and New School
Cognitive Science: The Enduring Power of Logocentric Categories, 13 LEG.
COMMUNICATION & RHETORIC: J. ALWD 39 (2016) [hereinafter Jewel,
Categories].
22
Berenguer et al., GUT RENOVATIONS, supra note 21.
23
Id. at 206.
24
Id.
25
Id. (citing Jewel, Categories, supra note 21, at 47, 55).
26
Id. at 207.
27
See PLATO, REPUBLIC bk. IV (discussing the concept of the Philosopher
King); Aristotle, General Theory on Constitutions and Citizenship,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/#ConCit, archived at
https://perma.cc/3GZJ-BKYX (discussing what types of person were best
suited for governance).
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held by enlightenment thinkers––John Locke, David Hume, Immanuel Kant,
Voltaire, and John Stuart Mill.28 Like Aristotle and Plato, these men believed
that people of color were not capable of engaging in reason and were not
capable of exercising the privileges of citizenship. This paper laid the
foundation for how a critical and comparative approach to legal rhetoric
might be able to accomplish legal problem-solving in a way that fosters more
equality, more justice, and more empathy.
Studying comparative legal rhetoric may actually help develop
collective thought patterns that counter the negative stereotypes found in
traditional legal rhetoric. In Neurorehetoric, Race, and the Law: Toxic Neural
Pathways and Healing Alternatives, I applied neuroscience theories to
explore how embodied legal rhetoric causes toxic racial stereotypes and
categories to become embedded in the human brain.29 In this paper, I
explained how rhetoric becomes embedded in the human brain.30 When a
person considers a thought pattern over and over again, we are left with a
somatic marker in our brain.31 Thus, the common rhetorical strategy of
repetition seems designed to help entrench a thought or conclusion in the
brain.”32 In terms of toxic racial categories, I illustrated how the “Welfare
Queen” metaphor became an entrenched thought pattern in the 1970s and
1980s, where the American public came to associate single mothers of color
with visual concepts of graft and fraud.33 The Welfare Queen metaphor
activated parts of the brain dealing with fear and disgust to cement a
collectively held racial stereotype that negatively influenced public attitudes
toward public assistance.34
Because of legal rhetoric’s iterative and repeated nature (the language
of precedential opinions and statutes is repeated, over and over), legal
language retains a special power within our minds and bodies.35 The

28

Id. at 210-211 (citing CHARLES MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 59-60
(1999).
29
See generally, Jewel, Neurorhetoric, Race, and the Law, supra note 21.
30
Id. at 671-72.
31
Id. (citing ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION,
REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 173-75 (1994)).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 677-78.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 680-81 (citing Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens:
How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233 (2014)).
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repetitive nature of legal rhetoric, such as the legal categories of alien,36
vagabond,37 or master-and-servant,38 helps entrench these exclusionary
concepts in the collective mindset. Embodied legal rhetoric is given further
power because it is imbued with the power of the state (being pronounced
guilty means that the state takes away your liberty). Legal language has the
literal ability to make reality.39 Metaphor and categories within culture can
get inside one’s head. But legal rhetoric can both get inside one’s head and
carry coercive consequences.
In Death in the Shadows, a paper that I co-authored with an arthistorian, we delved into the law-culture-law cycle.40 We supported our
thesis that communication from outside law (such as art and literature) have
a lot to tell us about law and—vice versa—the narratives we find in U.S. legal
history have influenced U.S. culture.41 In this paper, we talked about a
difficult subject, Jim Crow lynchings, and traced the practice through artwork
and music created in the 1930s as well as the violent antebellum laws that
existed prior to this terroristic practice. The point of this paper was to say
that culture is relevant to law and law is relevant to culture, even if the
connections are not immediately visible.

36

See, e.g., In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144,
160 (2d Cir. 2015), as amended (Dec. 17, 2015), aff'd sub nom. Jesner v.
Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 200 L. Ed. 2d 612 (2018) (“[H]ere, there
are aliens on both sides of the litigation.”). Coincidently, President Biden
has recently moved to remove the term alien from Federal law. Catherine E.
Shoichet, Biden Wants to Remove this Controversial Word from US Laws,
CNN Politics, CNN.COM (Jan. 21, 2021 2:13PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/21/politics/alien-biden-immigrationlaw/index.html.
37
See, e.g., Matthews v. State, 8 Md. App. 712, 713, 261 A.2d 804, 804
(1970) (Defendant was convicted of being a “rogue and a vagabond.”).
38
See, e.g., I.H. ex rel. Litz v. Cty. of Lehigh, 610 F.3d 797, 801–02 (3d
Cir. 2010) (“In Pennsylvania, only a ‘master-servant’ relationship gives rise
to vicarious liability for negligence.”) (internal citations omitted).
39
See Pierre Bourdieu, THE FORCE OF LAW: TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF THE
JURIDICAL FIELD, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 814, 827, 831 (Richard Terdiman trans.,
1987) (explaining that legal language, because it is imbued with the power
of the state, has a unique ability to construct social reality).
40
Campbell & Jewel, Death in the Shadows, supra note 21.
41
Id. at 174-179.
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In a later paper,42 I argued that law’s emphasis on reason and
reasonableness can cultivate the false belief that the law is always rational,
neutral, and free from emotion.43 This is not true because we now know that
the mind cannot be separated from the body in strict Cartesian fashion.44 In
this paper, I argued that the Western approach of empirically infusing
everything with ranking, order, and neatness creates a toxic mindset that has
been used to reach legal conclusions that ignore the lived reality of many
people. I traced how the emphasis on order and hierarchy has deep spiritual
and intellectual roots in U.S. legal culture.
A recurring theme in all of my previous work has been the need for
different legal processes, new ways of communicating, and alternative
thought patterns, all of which might be able to create a more just legal system.
This paper pivots from the critical scholar’s impulse to smash dearly-held
concepts in the name of radical change to theorize new avenues for
accomplishing that change.
This paper argues that in the realm of legal skills, there is value in
looking to alternative forms of rhetoric as guidance for reconstituting aspects
of our legal system to make them less toxic and more healing. There is also a
practical/skills-based component to the inquiry. For legal advocates, this
study might disclose rhetorical approaches that can improve the quality of the
arguments that lawyers make to persuade judges. Thus, this inquiry is aligned
with the legal academy’s recent turn toward emphasizing legal skills, but it
infuses the practical approach with a robust dose of interdisciplinary legal
theory.
Comparative legal rhetoric should be approached as a dynamic
discipline for the comparative study of how legal meanings are produced by
judicial actors (judges) as well as also other actors in the legal system. Like
other subsets of comparative law, the goals of comparative legal rhetoric
might include providing tools of research to identify universal theories of
legal persuasion, give a critical perspective of legal communication to
students, and promote cross-cultural understanding.45

42

Jewel, Reasonable Man, supra note 11, at 1055.
Id.
44
Id.
45
See, e.g., Esin Orucu, Developing Comparative Law in COMPARATIVE
LAW[:] A HANDBOOK 44 (Esin Orucu and David Nelken eds. Hart
Publishing 2007) [Hereinafter COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK].
43
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With respect to these goals, comparative legal rhetoric would study
the rhetoric of judicial opinions as well as the rhetoric of lawyers, who, in
making arguments to the court, create the legal meanings that become
entrenched in the collective legal mind. Of course, part of this inquiry would
require the evaluation of different systems, such as distinctions between
common law and civil judicial opinions,46 perhaps even questioning whether
there can be such a thing as judicial rhetoric to compare, given the collective
way that judges produce legal texts and the many constraints imposed upon
them.47 Further sources for inquiry, in developing a comparative approach to
legal rhetoric might include non-Western approaches to argument structure
and problem solving. Such jurisprudence can be located in formal legal
systems maintained by non-dominant groups, such as native American tribal
law, but it might also be located within systems of culture and processes that
exist outside of formal legal regimes.
Expanding beyond these laudable goals, comparative legal rhetoric,
at least in the manner that I am framing it, offers an additional goal that is
particularly relevant in our polarized times. Alternative legal communication
methods might contain healing properties, when we infuse these new
processes into legal systems that have historically struggled to dispense true
justice.
With respect to the goal of finding healing alternatives, it is possible
that the study might uncover effective methods of advocacy or persuasion
that have been theoretically undeveloped in the target jurisdiction. This
presupposes that there are problems with the target jurisdiction’s legal
system, thought patterns and forms of legal consciousness that are
normatively or morally in need of repair. As I have written previously, as
46

For instance there are distinct differences between the narrative
approaches taken in common law judicial opinions and the spartan and
austere style of Cour de Cassation opinions from France. See ARTHUR
TAYLOR VON MEHREN AND JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 1128 (2d
ed. Little Brown & Co. 1977) (citing Touffait & Tunc, Pour une motivation
plus explicite des decisions de justice notamment de celles de la Cour de
Cassation, 72 REVIEW TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 487, 506 (1974)
(noting that the laconic style of Cour de Cassation opinions, and its
anonymity, has been critiqued). I am grateful to Professor Helena WhalenBridge for first raising these distinctions at an Applied Storytelling
conference several years ago.
47
See Peter Ben Friedman, What Is a Judicial Author, 62 MERCER L. REV.
519 (2011).
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detailed above, the U.S. legal system suffers from over-formalization, hypercompetition, and decontextualization. In this context, comparative legal
rhetoric might help us locate solutions to promote healing in the home legal
system.
In this sense, healing is not just metaphoric. As described above,
applications of neuroscience theories (such as neuroplasticity) suggest that
rhetoric itself can actually change individual and collective thought patterns,
for better or worse. Thus, infusing alternative legal methods into a parent
legal system might improve the system. This rhetoric infusion method would
differ from comparative law’s “legal transplant” theory, where a less
powerful jurisdiction “receives” law from a more powerful one.48 The point
of this paper is not to condescendingly argue for the reform of jurisdictions
that may lack certain Anglo-American legal frameworks. Rather, the point
of this paper is to search for alternative rhetorical practices that might heal an
Anglo-American jurisdiction, which is ailing in certain respects.
When studying any alternative system of rhetoric for comparison
purposes, we must remain self-reflexive, we must not fall into the trap of
overly-reductive thinking, and we must not fetishize or marginalize the
system under study as the inferior or exotic “Other.” In his influential 1978
book ORIENTALISM, Professor Edward Said cogently explained how Western
colonial writers inflicted epistemological pain upon the inhabitants of other
cultures.49 Through pages and pages of literary references, Said showed how
English and French writers traveled to colonies located in Egypt, Turkey, and
the Levant and wrote narratives that stereotyped other cultures as lazy and
irrational and then remarked about how these qualities operated in direct
opposition to the clarity and nobility of the Anglo-Saxon race.50 Said
illustrated how other European writers, working in the Victorian era,
narrowly described the other cultures with titillating tales of sensuality and
licentiousness, stereotyping Near Eastern individuals as sensual and exotic in
juxtaposition with straight-laced Victorians (who most certainly also had a
seedy side).51

48

See David Nelken, Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture in
COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 118.
49

See generally, EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (Random House 1978).
Id. at 38-39, 145, 158.
51
Id. at 158 (discussing EDWARD WILLIAM LANE’S MANNERS AND
CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN EGYPTIANS).
50
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The problem was not just the too-broad brush. It was also troubling
that the European writers never allowed people to speak for themselves. Said
noted that Gustav Flaubert’s near-Eastern woman “never spoke of herself,
she never represented her emotions, presence, or history. He spoke for and
represented her.”52 Not allowing the subject to speak denied them their
individual humanity. While speaking about and for others, European writers
built an epistemological monopoly that encompassed the region and its
culture. The Western scholar’s knowledge about the region became the
region.53 Said detailed how Western ideas about the Near East became
ossified, cemented, and representative of reality, a reality that Said located in
1970s geopolitics (for instance, in Henry Kissinger’s views about the middle
east).54
Said’s book traced a specific intellectual history that began in the
1700s and ended in the 1970s. Because of the power and influence of the
various European writers who described the Near East, Said traced how these
reductive and essentialized ideas became ossified and rigid.55 In this way:
liberal humanism, of which Orientalism has
historically been one department, retards the
process of enlarged and enlarging meaning
through which true understanding can be
attained.
Said’s criticism of liberal humanism would become the foundation for
important critical scholarship within the humanities, works that “keep track
of the complex dynamics of institutional and other related power structures
in order to disclose options and alternatives for transformative praxis.”56
Said’s perspective also provided the framework and vocabulary for
rhetoricians who study rhetoric in a comparative, but critical way.57
At the time, Said’s critique of liberal humanism was an epic
takedown––what could possibly be wrong with liberal humanism? Now,
liberal humanism is often equated with biased, racist, and Euro-centric
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Id. at 6.
Id. at 31-33 (Discussing Arthur James Balfour, member of the British
House of Commons and expert on Britain’s imperial interests in Egypt).
54
Id. at 5.
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Id. at 254.
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West, supra note 13, at 105.
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See infra notes 201-238 and surrounding text.
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scholarship,58 a lineage that can be traced to Said’s critique referenced above.
However, Said remained committed to a humanistic hope that scholars can
exhibit a “will to understand for purposes of coexistence and humanistic
enlargement of horizons” without dominating and controlling what is being
studied.59 It may not be that liberal humanism is the problem. Rather, it is
conducting humanities research in a way that is neither liberal nor humane.
In comparative endeavors, there is also the temptation to fetishize or
essentialize “Other” systems and improperly reduce other cultures to simple
categories that function as foils to the Western system that is being compared.
For an academic, big distinctions and comparisons create much more of a
bang than a more granular approach. For instance, this Article profiles two
contrastive rhetoric papers, written in the 1960s and 1970s. These papers
contain some exciting takeaways related to logic and rhetoric differences
between native-English writers and non-English writers.60 This research was
unfortunately based on inappropriately broad comparisons.61 The original
paper was taken to task by younger researchers who pointed out the lack of
nuance and cultural bias.62 Nonetheless, despite these shortcomings, the
original research contains some grains of truth. I walk a kind of tightrope in
this paper; my goal is to identify authentic differences in communication in a
self-reflective and critical way, but also generate new and useful knowledge
based on these differences.
Finally, my research indicates that alternative rhetorics may not
provide a simplistic panacea for all that ails U.S. law. Many of the nonWestern societies that use alternative rhetoric are rigidly hierarchical, sexist,
and authoritarian. Any theory that a rhetorical Shang-ri-la exists somewhere
in Eastern rhetoric or Eastern thought patterns steps into the same trap of
essentialism and reductivism that Edward Said identified. There is also a
danger of inappropriate uses of the knowledge. For instance, think of how
some businesses have appropriated Eastern forms of thought (in the form of
58

See Faisal Nazir, Humanism With A Difference: Universality and Cultural
Difference in Postcolonial Theory, 2 J. CONTEMP. POL. 1, 6 (2018)
(Explaining how post-colonial literary criticism tends to equate humanism
with Euro-centricism and racism).
59
SAID, supra note 49, at xix. See also Nazir, supra note 58, at 6.
(Explaining that Said both criticized the colonial tradition within the liberal
humanities but also embraced humanist ideals that recognize cultural
differences).
60
See infra notes 111-117 and surrounding text.
61
See id.
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See id.
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mindfulness mantras and yoga poses) and deployed them in a crass way to
help workers become more efficient.63 Shang-ri-la may not exist, but pockets
of Nirvana may exist in various other cultures. These pockets are worth
looking for. This paper will address these critical challenges, understanding
that are no easy answers other than keeping an open mind about the limits of
new knowledge and remaining vigilantly critical in developing the discipline.
The next section develops the foundations for the study of comparative legal
rhetoric.
II.

The foundations of comparative legal rhetoric.

This section explores various disciplinary approaches that, when
synthesized, create the discipline of comparative legal rhetoric. Comparative
legal rhetoric draws upon a number of different disciplines: legal rhetoric,
comparative law, comparative rhetoric, contrastive rhetoric, diasporic
rhetoric, and comparative cognitive psychology. This part of the paper will
briefly introduce each one of these disciplines and explain its relevance for
the study of comparative legal rhetoric. The disciplines of comparative law
and comparative rhetoric both contain a highly critical sub-element; more
recent scholars have critiqued earlier generations of comparatists for
domineering analyses that impose a Western bias on non-Western law and
rhetoric. Thus, this section concludes with some thoughts on avoiding
essentialization and over-simplification. An overly reductive and biased
analysis is a dangerous trap for comparatists because such approaches harm
the overall project of developing an authentic and reflective understanding
for other rhetorics.
A.

Legal rhetoric

In order to apply a comparative approach to legal rhetoric, one must
first get a handle on legal rhetoric as a discipline in the context of the U.S.
legal system. Legal rhetoric could have both a narrow or broad definition. In
its narrowest conception, legal rhetoric might be construed as the art of legal
argumentation. For purposes of this paper, however, which seeks to outline
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See, e.g., Angela Harris, Care and Danger: Feminism and Therapy
Culture, 69 STUD. IN LAW, CULTURE AND SOC’Y 113 (2016), available at
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/faculty/eichner/harriscareanddanger.pdf (describing how “therapy culture,” which embraces
eastern forms of thinking (such as mindfulness), has been appropriated by
business culture to promote worker productivity and other capitalist aims).
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an approach for comparative legal rhetoric, a broad definition is most
appropriate.
Legal rhetoric is the scholarly and theoretical arm of the legal writing
discipline. In U.S. legal education., legal rhetoric has not long existed as a
standalone inquiry of study. Rather, most law schools offer legal
communication instruction in the form of legal writing classes, where
students are taught how to write formal legal analysis, in both an objective
and persuasive format. Linda Berger was one of the first professors in the
U.S. to teach legal rhetoric as a separate field of study. For Berger, legal
rhetoric “looks at how the law works by exploring a meaning-making
process, one in which the law is ‘constituted’ as human beings located within
particular historical and cultural communities write, read, argue about, and
decide legal issues.”64 In theorizing a definition for legal rhetoric, Berger was
influenced James Boyd White’s empowering conception of legal language,
which flows from his liberating, anti-formalist view of what law is. 65 For
White,
The law is not an abstract system or scheme of
rules, as we often speak of it, but an inherently
unstable structure of thought and expression.
It is built upon a distinct set of dynamic and
dialogic tensions, which include: tensions
between ordinary language and legal language;
between legal language and the specialized
discourses of other fields; between language
itself and the mute world that lies beneath it;
between
opposing
lawyers;
between
conflicting but justifiable ways of giving
meaning to the rules and principles of law;
between substantive and procedural lines of
thought; between law and justice; between the
past, the present, and the future.66
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Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching "Law as Rhetoric": A Place to
Stand, 16 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 4 (2010).
65
See id. at 4, n. 9 (citing James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as
Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 695
(1985)).
66
James Boyd White, An Old-Fashioned View of the Nature of Law, 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 381, 381 (2011).
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White’s views on legal language is liberating because it gives lawyers, law
students, and law theorists agency over the process of making legal meanings.
The law is not just a static system of rules to be studied, rather, students and
practitioners practice an “activity of mind and language” and claim
“reconstitute the material of the past [legal texts, precedents, etc.] to claim
new meaning in the present and future.”67
Legal rhetoric also allows legal writing teachers assert a meaningful
professional identity in opposition to the stereotype of legal writing teaching
as “donkey work” that does not carry substantive weight.68 Instead, when we
teach students how to write, we are teaching them to do––to craft new frames
and language that, with novel applications of legal principles, can transform
society. A broad conception of legal rhetoric moves legal writing beyond rote
mechanics and into an empowering world of process and jurisprudence,
where lawyers have great power to shift legal and cultural meanings for the
better.69
Berger and White’s liberating conception of legal rhetoric is
admittedly borne out of a common law process where advocacy and
reasoning are highly connected to the production of legal meanings that then
become vested with the power of the state. In other words, when an American
common law lawyer argues what the law should be and the court adopts that
meaning in its ruling, the lawyer has, in fact, made the law. The same can be
said for a law professor whose theories are adopted by a court in a published
decision. A broad definition of legal rhetoric could also apply in a civil law
context, where it would be wildly inaccurate to confine all legal meaning to
a code’s text. 70 Meaning depends on context and culture, thereby justifying
67

Id. at 386-387.
See Lucille A. Jewel, Oil & Water: How Legal Education’s Doctrine and
Skills Divide Reproduces Toxic Hierarchies, 31.1 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF
GENDER AND LAW 111, 113 (2015).
69
See Lucille A. Jewel, The Doctrine of Legal Writing, 1 SAVANNAH L.
REV. 45, 57-59 (2014) (explaining how a broad and critical approach to
legal writing and legal rhetoric prepares students to be transformative
lawyers).
70
Even in civil law jurisdictions, it is understood that the judge exercises
discretion over the text and may look, in addition to the language of the
code, to the social purpose the statute as meant to achieve. TAYLOR VON
MEHREN AND GORDLEY, supra note 46, 1134-1136; see also, Rodolfo
Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM.
J. OF COMP. L. 1, 33 (1991) (explaining that in civil law countries, there is a
certain amount of “disharmony” between the law as it is stated and how the
68
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a broad-based conception of how legal meanings are made and how those
legal meanings should be studied. Moreover, to foreshadow a bit, a broad
conception of legal rhetoric is helpful because it is aligned with a broad
conception of what comparative law should be, which is the next foundational
element of comparative legal rhetoric.
B.

Comparative Law

Traditionally, comparative law has been described as the objective
study of differing legal systems with the functional goal of comparing similar
things for the purpose of producing knowledge useful for solving problems
efficiently.71 The mainstream view was that “the study of foreign legal
systems is a legitimate enterprise only if it results in proposals for the reform
of domestic law.”72 The preeminent goal of the enterprise was harmonization
and unification, identifying commonalities within legal systems with the aim
of developing laws that cohered throughout different jurisdictions, such as
the project of developing a single body of private law for Europe.73 The goal
of the traditional comparative approach was to remove legal differences and
disagreements and to harmonize.74
As with the study of legal rhetoric, comparative law can be (and has
been) both broadly and narrowly conceptualized. Just as we should broadly
formulate the boundaries of legal rhetoric, a complex and critical conception
of comparative law offers the best chance for the production of reliable,
ethical, and useful knowledge in the study of comparative legal rhetoric.

judge applies it); Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUD.
232, 236 (2006 ) (explaining that “to say that the study of French law
consists in the study of French legislative texts and judicial decisions is
plainly inadequate”) [hereinafter Legrand, How to Compare Now].
71
William Twining, Globalisation and Comparative Law in COMPARATIVE
LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 78 (construing Zweigert and Kotz’s
understanding of comparative law); Pierre Legrand, Paradoxically,
Derrida: For a Comparative Legal Studies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 631, 63738 (2005) [hereinafter Legrand, Paradoxically Derrida].
72
Sacco, supra note 70, at 1.
73
Legrand, Parodoxically Derrida, supra note 71, at 637-638.
74
Roger Cotterell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 711 (Reimann and Zimmermann eds.
Oxford Univ. Press 2006) [hereinafter THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW].
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Contemporary legal comparatists have rightly criticized overly
narrow conceptions of the field, with some arguing that a practical objective
makes the study too “obsessively repetitious and sterile.”75 Comparative law
scholars have opined that comparatists must be careful not to oversimplify or
engage in synecdoche, looking at only one part without looking at the entire
system.76
From a critical perspective, legal comparatists have also pointed out
problems with translation:
Not only can two codes in different countries
use the same words with different meanings,
but two codes in the same country may give
different meanings to the same words, as
indeed, may two articles of the same code, two
authors of doctrinal works, or two judges.
Words do not, in fact, have absolute permanent
meanings. Every speaker, whenever he uses an
expression endows it with an unrepeatable
specific meaning.77
Thus, even when the same word or same root word is used, two countries
with two different cultural traditions may give drastically different meanings
to those words. For instance, the word contract in the U.K.’s common law
tradition is very different from the French term contrat. The U.K. connotation
for contract connotes an agreement to transfer property, whereas the French
connotation of contrat reflects one person’s entrustment of property to
another.78 We must also recognize that words have political values, and if we
ignore these competing values, we will experience translation failure.79 For
instance, saving has a positive valence in the U.S. and U.K. but a negative
value in France.80
Comparative law scholar William Twining has criticized the
comparative law discipline for being too “state-oriented, secular, positivist,
top-down, North-centric, unempirical, and universalist in respect of
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Legrand, How to Compare Now, supra note 70, at 233.
Sacco, supra note 70, at 14-15.
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morals.”81
Gunter Frankenberg lamented the false and oppressive
dichotomies that can arise from a non-critical approach.82 These comparatists
are tapping into the same sentiment voiced by humanities scholars like
Edward Said83 and Cornel West,84 sharing the impulse to dismantle
canonistic approaches, critique traditional analysis, and advocate for
something more nuanced and reflective of the potential for bias.85
This set of critical comparatists argue that comparative law scholars
should compare different legal systems with an understanding that the law is
not a bounded set of static rules but is instead a collection of “legal formants”
comprised of the written statutes, case law, and the more implicit rules that
actors actually follow and obey.86 An effective comparison of law would
explore existing legal and cultural differences between the home jurisdiction
and other jurisdiction but also account for differences in power between the
home jurisdiction and other jurisdictions.87 Moreover, the comparative law
scholar must understand that “[o]ne’s home culture is almost inevitably
privileged through familiarity and the reinforcement of comfortable
myths.”88 This privilege invariably makes it so that the foreign or “other”
culture is often framed as deficient or disadvantaged in relation to a scholar’s
home culture.”89
The law-culture-law cycle provides another reason to take culture into
account. Because law influences culture and culture influences law,90 culture
cannot be separated from law in a comparative endeavor. Culture is a hidden
infrastructure that must be surfaced and understood in order to fully
81
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See Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Critical Legal Studies in THE
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appreciate a different legal system.91 Thus, as a best practice for comparative
legal rhetoric, good comparison requires engagement with the “cognitive
structure of a given legal culture.”92 The comparatist should identify the
community standards individuals use to make sense of the world.93
Identifying culture requires more than a surface look because much of culture
emanates from unconscious thought patterns that all members of a
community share.94 Engaging with a community’s culture in a granular and
nuanced way can prevent overly reductive and simplistic analysis.95
Finally, as explained above with respect to comparative analysis in
general,96 a good comparative law scholar must be self-critical and selfreflexive. This means that scholars should search for their own privilege and
bias, which might color how they categorize concepts found in other legal
systems. Scholars must be careful not to impose judgment on a foreign legal
system based on pre-conceived notions of what law should be.97 We must
try to avoid too-easy comparisons and analogies that tend toward overly
simplified and reductive conclusions. Outside of law and in the field of
communication studies, comparative rhetoric scholars have also identified a
91

Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 74, at 709-737.
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COMPARATIVE L. QUART. 52, 60 (Quoted in GEOFFREY SAMUEL, AN
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Publishing 2015).
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Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture in THE OXFORD
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Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus concept best explains how collective,
unconscious thought processes act as agents for a community’s social
organization. See Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal
Education: How Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class
Hierarchy 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1161 (2008).
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Legrand, How to Compare Now, supra note 70, at 232, 238 (2006) (“Only
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conclusions.”); Sacco, supra note 70, at 21-22, 26 (to avoid reductionism,
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undertaking a comparison of two systems).
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similar need for self-reflexivity. In laying the theoretical foundation for
comparative legal rhetoric, we now examine comparative rhetoric.
C.

Comparative Approaches to Rhetoric

This section discusses three subfields of rhetoric that have
comparative dimensions: contrastive rhetoric, comparative rhetoric, and
diasporic rhetoric. These three disciplines contain lessons on how to be
sensitive and cognizant of the power dynamics that might be influencing how
we perceive difference. Contrastive rhetoric relates to specific differences in
logic and rhetoric, visible in how students from different cultures approach
composition and writing. Comparative rhetoric is a relatively new field that
has rhetoric scholars studying differences and similarities between rhetorical
practices of different cultures. The third field is the study of diasporic
rhetoric, oppositional rhetorical practices emerging from people who have
been displaced by colonialism or who have migrated to spaces where they
experience a marginalized minority identity.98
i. Contrastive Rhetoric
As university education became more globally diverse, college
composition professors began observing and noting differences in student
writing that could be explainable by cultural differences.99 The resulting
discipline was contrastive rhetoric, which looks at the cultural characteristics
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See generally, Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Still Writing at the Master’s Table:
Decolonizing Rhetoric in Legal Writing for a “Woke” Legal Academy, 21
ST. MARY’S THE SCHOLAR 255, 274-91 (2019) [hereinafter McMurtryChubb, Still Writing at the Master’s Table]; Berenguer et al., Gut
Renovations, supra note 21, at 26.
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Robert B. Kaplan, Cultural Thought Patterns in Inter-Cultural
Education, 16 LANGUAGE LEARNING 1 (1966) [hereinafter Kaplan, Cultural
Thought Patterns]; Robert B. Kaplan, A Further Note on Contrastive
Rhetoric, supra note 8; Carolyn Matalene, Contrastive Rhetoric: An
American Writing Teacher in China, 47 COLLEGE ENGLISH 789, 789-90
(1985); Ryuiko Kubota, A Reevaluation of the Uniqueness of Japanese
Written Discourse: Implications for Contrastive Rhetoric, 14 WRITTEN
COMMUNICATION 460, 460 (1997); Jill J. Ramsfield, Is “Logic” Culturally
Based? A Contrastive, International Approach to the U.S. Law Classroom,
47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 167-68 (1997); Diane B. Kraft, Contrastive
Analysis and Contrastive Rhetoric in the Legal Writing Classroom, 49 N.M.
L. Rev. 35, 39 (2019).
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of text written in different languages.100 The question to be answered by
contrastive rhetoric, is whether or not logic (as conceptualized in the West)
is a universal skill or rather a product of cultural communication norms?101
Robert Kaplan is considered the “father of contrastive rhetoric,” based
on his 1966 article Cultural Thought Patterns in Inter-Cultural Education.102
In this article, Kaplan noted that logic, as it is taught in U.S. English
composition courses, derives from a “Platonic-Aristotelian sequence,
descended from the philosophers of ancient Greece and shaped subsequently
by Roman, Medieval European, and later Western thinkers.”103 Kaplan
theorized that when foreign students receive poor feedback on their writing,
it could be because the study is employing a different mode of thought and
logic that “violate[s] the expectations of the native reader.”104
In reviewing student-written paragraphs, Kaplan detailed his
perceptions with respect to several different cultural traditions. Kaplan first
hypothesized that Semitic languages (including Hebrew and Arabic) use
many more parallel constructions than English and, as a result, an essay
written by an Arabic speaker comes off as more complex than necessary.105
For Asian writers, Kaplan observed a tendency to approach a topic by
indirection in a circular fashion.106 “The circles or gyres turn around the
subject and show it from a variety of tangential views, but the subject is never
looked at directly.”107 For a writer whose first language is Spanish or French,
Kaplan diagnosed a tendency to digress inside the paragraph, producing an
interesting thought, but one that does not contribute to the paragraph’s
substance. 108 Russian writers apparently begin with two short and direct
sentences, but then move on to one or more lengthy sentences that do not
relate to the main point but which support subordinate points.109 Kaplan
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concluded his analysis with a drawing that was supposed to illustrate these
cultural differences in logic:110

Eventually, Kaplan’s article became known as the “doodle paper.”111
Kaplan’s approach has been roundly criticized, even ridiculed, for using too
small of a data set, for being overly reductive, for essentializing, and for
imperialistically elevating the English norm as preferential over logical
practices from other cultures.112 Ryuiko Kubota, in discussing contrastive
rhetoric as applied to native Japanese writing, pointed out the wrongness of
a generalization that Asian rhetoric is always “indirect.”113 Such a sweeping
generalization inaccurately frames Japanese rhetoric as a static practice rather
than practice that, like Western rhetoric, can take many different forms.114
Also problematic is contrastive rhetoric’s impulse to organize and categorize
different rhetorical practices, placing so-called English linearity at the top.115
Finally, Kaplan’s approach ignored the strong influence that Western rhetoric
has had on Asian writing, such that contemporary writing teachers in Asia
now expect their students to master linear logic.116
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reductive of an analysis); Ramsfield, supra note 99, at 169 (explaining that
Kaplan’s analysis improperly treated other cultures as a monolithic, static
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Kraft, supra note 99, at 41-42 (explaining that Kaplan’s analysis is too
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113
Kubota, supra note 99, at 461.
114
Id. at 464-65.
115
Id. at 471.
116
Id. at 469, 472.
111

25
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3786244

Robert Kaplan committed the sin of trying to devise a “master
narrative [for] . . . monolithic culture[s].”117 Despite the flaws in his analysis,
the fact remains that there are real differences in how reason in conducted in
various cultures. For instance, as set forth more fully below, Asian rhetoric
emphasizes the skill of “multiple definition,” which looks at a problem from
various vantage points.118 Multiple definition aligns with Kaplan’s
observation that Asian rhetoric uses a circular pattern and views an issue from
a variety of stances.119 Other differences include the Chinese cultural deemphasis on individual authorship. Instead of treasuring creativity and
individuality in writing, Chinese culture exalts authors who have memorized
a vast amount of material (metaphors, proverbs, etc.) who can then repeat
“maxims, exempla, and analogies presented in established forms and
expressed in well-known phrases.”120
Chinese communication norms also privilege metaphor and unstated
premises (enthymemes) more than the English tradition of direct and linear
thoughts.121 For instance, in the 1960s, Chinese readers readily understood a
headline “Chairman Mao went swimming” to mean that Chairman Mao had
taken charge to quell his political adversaries so that he could launch the
Chines cultural revolution.122 It is highly unlikely that English readers would
be able to comprehend the headline in the same way. That Asian
communication is perceived as more indirect is also related to a different
orientation. Asian communication is a listener rather than a speaker oriented
system (which is the case in English).123 In a listener-oriented system, the
listener or hearer is expected to interact with the rhetoric and actively parse
out the speaker’s meaning, whereas in the Western tradition, the speaker is
supposed to do this work for the listener. Neither way is inherently better than
117
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368 (1992).
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the other, although Western writing teachers often counsel students to make
the reader’s job easier, not harder.124 Kaplan’s error was not necessarily that
he pointed out differences, but that he painted with too broad of a brush and
improperly elevated English norms over other approaches. 125
Despite the errors made by Kaplan and other scholars who have
compared and contrasted different logical traditions, studying logic in a
comparative or contrastive way has value. Professor Diane Kraft explained
that law professors who teach law students from non-English backgrounds
can make critical and cautious use of contrastive rhetoric to “reach
proficiency in legal writing without negating the rhetoric of students’ native
language and cultures.”126 Law professor Jill Ramsfield argued that
contrastive rhetoric can help “close the gap between legal cultures and
between the initiated and uninitiated.”127
Professor Kubota explained that contrastive rhetoric is useful for
providing insight into the cultural aspects of writing as long as scholars
employ a critical framework.128 A critical approach to contrastive rhetoric can
help communication scholars and teachers bridge gaps but might also help
identify approaches that work better than the dominant English approach.129
For instance, because legal writing is so heavily dependent on precedent and
124
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key legal terms, the Chinese approach to rhetoric (de-emphasizing individual
authorship and emphasizing the use of time-honored forms phrases) could
augment a Eurocentric approach to authorship. Indeed, much of legal writing
departs from a romantic notion of authorship.130 Lawyers routinely cut and
paste language from other briefs (without any attribution) and judges
routinely cut and page language from the briefs lawyers submit on a case, for
inclusion in the case opinion.131
There might also be situations where a listener-oriented approach to
legal communication might work better than a speaker-oriented approach. A
listener-oriented approach is definitely the better approach for a law
advocate’s “shadow story,” the part of the case narrative that contains the
advocate’s ultimate legal conclusions.132 These conclusions are strongest for
our readers/listeners when the author enables the audience to reach these
conclusions on their own, without the advocate having to explicitly tell
them.133 Directly telling the audience to adopt these conclusions can come
off as a too-strident drop-kick.134
ii. Comparative Rhetoric
a. An Initial Survey of Comparative Rhetoric
In 1998, venerable classics professor George A. Kennedy wrote
Comparative Rhetoric, a book that compared rhetorical traditions from
across the world and time.135 Kennedy’s book begins with an expansive
definition of rhetoric––non-verbal, verbal, and written communication
forms that exists “in all life forms that can give signals” including
“nonhuman animals.”136 Kennedy then defined comparative rhetoric as “the
cross-cultural study of rhetorical traditions as they exist or have existed in
different societies around the world.”137 Kennedy first located rhetorical
practices within the swaggering struts of stag deer, the distinctive calls of
vervets signaling the approach of different predators, and the particular
130
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caws of crows calling for group assembly.138 Kennedy then addressed
rhetoric in tribal indigenous cultures, found in the form of narrative, myths,
and community speeches.139 He concluded the book by considering rhetoric
in ancient societies such as Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, and Greece.140
One of the takeaways from Kennedy’s book is that much rhetoric
from around the world is profoundly conservative, in the sense that it seeks
to conserve communities from danger or change. Rhetoric’s
conservativeness is visible in the rhetoric of animals, who use rhetoric to
signal the appearance of dangerous predators,141 and in ancient communities
and contemporary tribal societies, who use rhetoric to reinforce traditional
values and social hierarchy in the community.142
In analyzing indigenous or traditional cultures (Australian
aborigines, African Ashanti society, and indigenous tribes in the U.S.),
Kennedy opined that “the most common function of rhetoric in traditional
societies is preservation of their accustomed beliefs and way of life.”143
Even in so-called “egalitarian” indigenous societies, women are not often
allowed to speak. They are not allowed to speak in formal meetings, but
may be allowed to have a voice in less formal settings.144
Ancient societies also deployed rhetoric for conservative aims. For
instance, the ancient Aztecs used formal oratory “as a conservative force,
preserving the moral and political values of the past and reinforcing class
divisions.”145 In ancient China, rhetoric was “conservative, even reactionary,
aimed at consensus, and sought to reaffirm social and political hierarchies,
modeled on family relationships in which great emphasis was put in the
authority of a father over his sons and the respect of a son for a father.”146
Perhaps the most hierarchical ancient society was India, with its rigid caste
system, where one was supposed to accept one’s lot and act his/her part to
obtain a better station in the next life.147 Fascinatingly, India’s hyperhierarchical caste system may be directly related to its Indo-European
138
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language, Sanskrit, which easily allowed for abstraction and category
making.148 Ancient Indian society used everyday language to maintain its
hard-line social boundaries, with strict grammar rules indicating that an
untouchable could never use the first-person when addressing someone of a
higher caste.149 An untouchable must always refer to himself/herself in the
third person or simply say “your slave.”150 In thinking about some of the most
spectacular human rights failures in the West, such as the racialized social
codes in the Jim Crow south, where men of color were always addressed as
“boy” and had to refer to White men as “sir,” or Nazi Germany’s violent
social control of Jewish people, the unfortunate takeaway is that these forms
of social control are not limited to the West. In many ways, non-Western
rhetoric is not that different from Western rhetoric, which is often deployed
to put everything and every being in its hierarchical place.151
Thus, in this learning journey to locate healing alternatives for
Western legal rhetoric, ancient, tribal, or indigenous rhetorics may not
contain the powerful elixir we seek. Nonetheless, Professor Kennedy’s study
raises some fascinating observations garnered from ethnographies of
acephalous indigenous societies, societies that may not egalitarian along the
lines of gender but are committed to equality in terms of social class. 152 In his
book, Kennedy draws upon the work of Donald Brenneis, an anthropologist
who studied the traits of speech in acephalous communities.153 In a book
chapter exploring the Bhatgoans, an acephalous community in Fiji, Brenneis
explains that “clear-cut leadership does not exist and decision making is
consensual.”154 In these societies, formal rhetoric is highly polite and any
criticism is indirect, allusive, with ambiguous referents.155 Further, in order
to cultivate confidence in one’s leadership, one must demonstrate an “overt
reluctance to assume leadership.”156 (This sounds like many law faculty
148
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members, explaining that the ideal law school dean doesn’t really want to be
a dean.)
Brenneis’s work on the Bhatgoans also surfaces the important role
that process plays in comparing different rhetorics. The Bhatgoans solved
problems through arbitration sessions, a process managed by committee that
entailed fact-finding and discussion of topics that could not be discussed
elsewhere.157 The committee members chairing the session must not appear
“too eager” and should not dominate the proceedings.158 The arbitration
sessions collected facts and served as a record for future discussions, but
intentionally did not include any kind of structured resolution or remedy.159
The process served as a method of airing out grievances in front of the entire
community. The non-confrontational, open-ended Bhatgoan arbitration
session seems similar to the processes used by many contemporary
indigenous communities to reintroduce a criminal offender back into
society160 The Bhatgoan way also shares some similarity to Quaker and
Anarchist approaches to problem-solving, which will also be discussed,
infra.161
A host of rhetorical practices from around the world and time
indicates some universality in what is considered effective rhetoric.
Kennedy’s book also questions the widely-held belief that the ancient Greeks
produced most of the world’s knowledge on the art of persuasion. For
instance, both Buddhist and Chinese rhetoric emphasize sincerity and
restraint as an effective way for generating speaker credibility, similar to the
Greek notion of ethos.162 The Aztecs deployed formal repetition as a
strategy,163 similar to the Greek and Roman tricolon (stating a concept three
times for emphasis)164 and the African American diasporic tradition of using
rhythmic repetition for point emphasis.165 Indigenous tribes in the U.S. drew
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upon the rhetorical skill of memory (one of Aristotle’s five canons necessary
for effective persuasion) by using elaborate wampum belts to chart out the
pieces of a lengthy speech.166 And finally, ancient Hebrew rhetoricians relied
heavily on finding the right time to make an argument, which strongly mirrors
the Greek concept of Kairos.167
Kennedy’s book also brings up a potentially universal relationship
between rhetoric style and social ranking. In Wolof society, for instance,
persons of lower rank used rhetoric that was loud, high-pitched, repetitious,
with many points of emphasis.168 Higher ranked persons spoke more softly,
with a lower pitch, with less repetition and emphasis.169 For Ethiopia’s Mursi
people, a successful, high-ranking orator does not show emotion, does not
repeat himself, and speaks in a clear way.170 The idea that softer, subtle
speech connects with higher social rank and louder more garish speech links
to lower social rank may have some universality. In ancient Greece, for
instance, successful rhetors showed restraint and confidence in their
mannerisms, which were derived from the physical habits of elite Greek
military-men.171 Non-elite speakers were weak rhetors described as having
overly shrill voices and too-large hand gestures.172 In a masterful article,
Michigan State Law Professor Daphne O’Regan traced the class-based
connections between Grecian norms for public speaking (based on the
nonverbal demeanor of elite warriors) and today’s legal culture, where
restraint, control, and clarity are expected.173 Similarly, French sociologist
Pierre Bourdieu pointed out that French upper-class culture approved the use
of highly restrained language and slow gestures but found spontaneous verbal
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outspokenness, irritation, and rapidity to be vulgar.174 The distinction
traverses into consumer preferences, as Bourdieu noted that the wealthy
desire “quiet caress of beige carpets” and a perfume “as imperceptible as a
negative scent” over the “tattered, garish linoleum” and “harsh smell of
bleach” found in the lower class homes.175 In the U.S., wealthy consumers
signal their status in a subtle fashion with clothing that contains tiny status
markers, like Ralph Lauren and Brooks Brothers shirts.176
Western cultural critics are well aware that subtlety is upper-class and
garishness is lower-class, in the context of speech, clothing, and other taste
signifiers. The interesting point here is that a study of comparative rhetoric
indicates that these associations may have universality beyond Western
culture. Across cultures, if one has a high social rank, one can afford to signal
at a lower volume and still command respect and attention. One can speak
softly without having to yell because power means that others will hear and
listen to your voice. However, in order to maintain that power, one must
visibly display subtlety and restraint, reminding everyone that he/she will be
listened to no matter how softly they speak.
Another interesting observation is that some egalitarian societies
made decisions based on consensus rather than majority rule.177 In traditional
societies, a speech is often followed by silence, effectively signaling group
agreement.178 In some of these societies, when the Greek method of majority
rule by vote was introduced, it was resented.179 A call for a vote was regarded
as leading to a fight, to winners and losers, creating a hard situation where
the loser must preserve self-respect. 180 The Greeks introduced an eristic
winner-takes-all kind of rhetoric with a particularly competitive and
pugilistic mode of argument.181 The Greeks were outliers in their
contentiousness.182 “In the traditional and early literate societies. . ., the goal
174
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of deliberative rhetoric [was] usually consensus and concord in accordance
with conservative values, and sharp altercation [was] avoided if possible.”183
“In the ancient rhetoric of Egypt, Palestine, India, and China, there are
injunctions to turn away wrath with a soft answer, or even to be silent.”184
The Greek practice of vote-counting also encouraged muscular rhetoric
aimed at those who would vote in favor, without any need for currying favor
to those who would disagree, as would be necessary if consensus was the
model.185 Thus, in the ancient and non-Western world, rhetoric was generally
used for agreement and conciliation, but the Greek view of life being a contest
took hold and has been a part of Western society ever since.186 Some pockets
of Western culture, such as Quaker and Anarchist approaches, differ by
embracing less pugilistic forms of debate. We will discuss those pockets
infra.187
Finally, Kennedy’s book touches on one of the most enduring
comparisons in comparative rhetoric–– the differences between Eastern
thought (typically defined as Asian, China, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, etc.) and
Western European thought.188 Kennedy traced the multi-variegated
foundations of Chinese rhetoric, covering Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist
influences as well as distinct rhetorical traditions popular in different eras of
Chinese history.189 Throughout these broad influences, Kennedy identifies
key generalities relevant for understanding Chinese rhetoric. These include:
•

The concept of multiple definition––the belief that “if
something is to be understood and communicated correctly, it
requires description from multiple objective and subjective
stances.”190
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•

The belief that persuasion is not a battle to be won as
differences in view point cannot be overcome by
persuasion.191

•

The interests of the individual and society should be regarded
as identical.192

•

There should be basic equality for all but with some limits
because everyone must fulfil his/her hierarchical station in
life.193

•

Engaging with contradiction is important in the pursuit of
knowledge, holding that what is real might be an illusion, and
what is a dream might be real.194

•

Silence and introspection are important in the process of
locating the truth.195

Chinese rhetoric is not monolithic, however. Even as Taoist thought rejects
categories, deductive argument, and verbal distinctions, other schools of
Chinese thought (such as the School of Names) embraced logical argument
forms in ways that mirrored classical Western rhetoric, particularly the
sophists. 196 Even as most of Chinese thought can be generalized as
privileging the group over the individual, a notable Chinese philosopher from
the Fourth Century, Yang Chu, argued that decisions should be evaluated
based on their impact on the individual.197 Kennedy concluded his chapter on
Chinese rhetoric by noting that throughout its history, most Chinese thinkers
believed that an authoritarianism provided the most reasonable and stable
society.198 Kennedy also explained that throughout its history, Chinese
society has clamped down on free speech and criticism of authority, which
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was thought to lead to disorder.199And, he notes that “Marxism in China took
up many features of traditional Chinese rhetoric.”200
Kennedy’s book opened up exciting avenues for rhetorical inquiry,
especially in connecting knowledge gained from anthropological and
ethnographic study of the communication forms in non-Western and
traditional societies. Within Kennedy’s book, there is a lot of material that
could be helpful for facilitating cross-cultural communication. There seems
to be some incidences of universal modes of persuasion, exciting knowledge
to pursue. And finally, certain rhetorical practices might be useful as
alternative strategies to aid Westerners in communication––practicing silence
or holding two contradictory concepts in the mind at the same time comes to
mind. But in looking at rhetoric from around the world, it seems like there
are no grand theory solutions where we might import one culture’s rhetoric
into our own culture and reach a Shang-ri-la stage.
b. The Critical Turn in Comparative Rhetoric
In the same way that Robert Kaplan’s contrastive rhetoric thesis was
critiqued as too reductive and essentialist, there were similar critiques of
Kennedy’s book.201 These critical comparative rhetoric scholars
problematized comparing Eastern and Western traditions in a rigidly
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dichotomous way.202 On this point, critical rhetoric scholars were highly
influenced by a seminal essay by Linda Alcoff, The Problem of Speaking for
Others. 203 “[T]he practice of privileged persons speaking for or on behalf of
less privileged persons has actually resulted (in many cases in increasing or
reinforcing the oppression of the group spoken for.”204Alcoff suggests that
Foucault’s “ritual of speaking” offers a good approach to consider rhetoric.
Speech is comprised of just words, but “discursive practices of speaking or
writing that involve not only the text or utterance but their position within a
social space including the persons involved in, acting upon, and/or affected
by the words.”205 Alcoff urged rhetoricians to engage with context, the
location of speech, and the particular political and power dynamics at play
between the agents carrying the messages.206 Rather than retreating and not
speaking at all, Alcoff encourages rhetoricians to engage in a dialogue with
the subject’s speech, speaking with the subject rather than speaking for the
subject.207 Speaking should always carry accountability and responsibility
such that “anyone who speaks for others should only do so out of a concrete
analysis of the particular power relations and discursive effects involved.”208
Perhaps the most important point of critique is that some previous
comparative rhetoric scholars placed different rhetoric traditions in a
discourse of deficiency.209 Robert Kaplan’s doodle paper210 is an example of
a discourse of deficiency because it placed the English linear approach on the
left side (processed first by the Western eye) and all the other approaches
toward the right.211 Kaplan’s overly-reductive conclusions were biased
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because they painted the differences too broadly and placed the English
approach as the standard against which all the other traditions were judged.212
Another aspect of the discourse of deficiency is the implicit judgment
that comes from saying that one culture lacks something that the dominant
culture possesses. For instance, the allegation that Chinese culture does not
emphasize individualism like Western culture places Chinese culture in a
deficiency framework.213 Instead of pointing out the absence of a concept in
one culture, a better approach would be to focus on the presence of something
else analogous in the culture. For instance, Professor Mao points out that the
Chinese emphasis on group harmony could be framed as a method of
producing valuable social capital214 that produces palpable benefits for the
group.215 Whereas Western culture emphasizes individualism and
competition for “getting ahead,” Chinese culture achieves a similar group,
but through group effort. Instead of this more nuanced kind of comparison,
many scholars simply emphasize the absence of individualism within
Chinese culture, which implicitly places the absence in a framework of
deficiency.
Finally, there is the problem of Western scholars inappropriately
organizing material into forms that align with European culture. Indigenous
spirituality scholar Barbara Alice Mann refers to this process as “euroform[ing] the data, . . . lopping, cropping, and cramming into Western molds,
regardless of fit.”216 Professor Mann provides the example of European
thinkers bending over backwards to find evidence of a non-existent
monotheism in North American indigenous spiritual practices.217 Heavily
imprinted with Judeo-Christian monotheism, Western scholars also have a
difficult time with knowledge models that depart from one-thinking (that
there is one explanation, one agent, one father, etc.). Mann gives the example
of Charles Colcock Jones, a white observer of the Creeks in the 1870s, who
was befuddled that the Creeks had two different origin stories, one from the
earth, and one from the sky. Unable to process the concept of two origin
stories, he described the stories as “competing,” and opined that one story
212
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most be an impostor.218 The refusal to understand another culture on its own
terms is a kind of deficiency discourse because it assumes that any departures
from a Euro-centric one-thinking model just cannot be.
Recently, critical comparative rhetoric scholars came together and
drafted a manifesto for how comparative rhetoric should be carried out. That
manifesto defined comparative rhetoric as follows:
Comparative
rhetoric
examines
communicative practices across time and space
by attending to historicity, specificity, selfreflexivity, processual predisposition, and
imagination. Situated in and in response to
globalization, comparative rhetoricians enact
perspectives/performances that intervene in
and transform dominant rhetorical traditions,
perspectives,
and
practices.
As
an
interdisciplinary practice, comparative rhetoric
intersects with cognate studies and theories to
challenge the prevailing patterns of power
imbalance and knowledge production.219
To avoid the perils of a too-reductive and hierarchical view of culture,
a comparative rhetorician should take an emic, as opposed to an etic
approach. An emic approach would study the non-Euroamerican rhetorical
practices on their own terms, being cognizant of the dominant rhetorical
tradition that provides the vantage point.220 On the other hand, an etic
approach looks at a system and makes judgments based on components not
in the system being studied.221 For instance, concluding that Chinese society
lacks individualism would be a problematic etic approach because it is
attempting an analogy within a culture that does not contain the same deepseated cultural referents.222 In other words, to say that Chinese rhetoric is not
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individualistic is a “non-application.”223 Concluding that there is an absence
of a dominant concept and moving on commits the error of comparing before
the comparatist truly knows the culture.224 The practice also “reinforces a
stereotypical binary that unfortunately pits one against the other.”225
Instead of concluding that Chinese society lacks individualism and
moving on, an emic approach would look for the “appropriate frames and
languages [that] can be developed to deal with differences as well as
similarities between different traditions.”226 A rhetorical comparatist would
look for clusters of concepts that may not be equivalent, but could be
construed as analogous.227 And, a thoughtful comparatist would try to bridge
the gap between “what we think we know about and can speak for the other
and what has to happen in order for us to begin to know about and speak for
the other.”228
For instance, Professor LumMing Mao, the chair of the writing and
rhetoric program at the University of Utah developed a compelling emic
explanation of a concept that connects with––but does not equate to––the
Western concept of individualism. Mao explained that China did not have a
word to depict individualism until very recently.229 The Chinese concept of
self is “irreducibly social, . . . forever intertwined with other selves . . with an
ever-expanding circle of relations.”230 Unlike Western concepts of the self,
the Chinese have no correlate concept for self-actualization, a constantly
running self-improvement treadmill.231 Instead of the quest to improve one’s
self, Chinese culture celebrates the development and maintenance of a
network of interrelatedness and interdependence.232
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Professor Mao contrasts Western individualism (as a positive moral
value) with the Chinese concept of Shu. A person practicing shu uses one’s
heart and mind to compare oneself with others.233 Shu is the process of
looking inside oneself and connecting one’s own needs and desires with the
needs and desires of others.234 In Chinese philosophy, practicing shu is the
crux of becoming a “humane person.”235 In the way that self-actualization is
most valued in Western culture, the practice of becoming is most valued in
Chinese culture.236
In looking at different rhetorical (and, more broadly, philosophical)
traditions that could be applied to law, the takeaway is that one should deeply
study the other culture on its own terms. The analysis should focus on
selecting concepts that might be worth analogizing to. For instance, in the
discussion of individualism and shu, one might think about how shu––the
process of becoming––could apply to lawyers entering the legal profession.
Instead of a focus on hyper-competitive individual merit (LSAT scores, GPA,
law school rank), shu might provide an alternative barometer, a healing
alternative, for evaluating value. Instead of looking at a law student’s grades
and scores, how well has the law student built a network of caring and
support? The emic approach also provides a helpful framework for evaluating
other culture’s processes and rhetorical cultures that might be applied to law.
Overall, these critical points are well-thought out and could easily be
applied to a discipline focused on comparative legal rhetoric. The critical
comparative rhetoricians’ call to cultivate granular “grids of intelligibility”
and avoid binaries and borders is especially instructive. 237 This advice is
quite similar to the critical law comparatists, discussed above, who exhorted
scholars to view two legal systems as a complex and foundational set of
formants, touching on both law and culture.238 Following this advice would
have legal scholars engaging in comparative legal rhetoric would first, try to
understand the other legal rhetoric culture on its own terms, then construct
responsive frameworks for the two systems being compared, and finally
make thoughtful and self-reflexive analogies or distinctions.
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iii. Diasporic Rhetoric
The final piece of comparative rhetoric helpful for studying
comparative legal rhetoric is diasporic rhetoric. Diasporic rhetoric captures
the rhetorical practices of people who have been uprooted from their
homelands (such as Black Americans descended from enslaved persons or
indigenous Americans who have been dispossessed by U.S. settlers) or who
have migrated to a place where they are now a marginalized minority.239 In
an exceptional recent law review article, Professor Teri McMurty-Chubb
details the emergence of diasporic rhetoric, focusing on indigenous, African
diasporic, Asian diasporic, and Latinx rhetoric.240 Professor McMurtryChubb explains that because diasporic rhetoric emerged “on the contested
terrain of the colonizer and the colonized,” it operates in opposition to
mainstream rhetorics.241 The oppositional style of diasporic rhetoric is useful
because it an “help to create alternate conversations, oppositional discourse,
to Western discourses of privilege and power.242 For instance, Indigenous
rhetoric within the U.S. centers on “rhetorical sovereignty” and “survivance,”
two concepts that directly relate to the indigenous experience in the U.S. 243
Rhetorical sovereignty and survivance are oppositional in part because they
are not countenanced in mainstream legal decisions disposing of indigenous
claims in deeply unjust ways.244
While diasporic rhetoric does not directly involve comparison, critical
comparison is part of it. Because diasporic rhetoric creates alternative modes
of knowing, understanding, and communicating in contrast to the majority
approach, it is inherently comparative. Diasporic rhetoric enables what Henry
Giroux refers to as border pedagogy, a form of teaching, centered on
difference, that allows students and teachers to highlight “contradictions in
American society between the meaning of freedom, the demands of social
justice, and the obligations of citizenship, on the one hand, and the
accumulated suffering, domination, force, and violence that permeates all
aspects of everyday life on the other.”245 A topic like diasporic rhetoric also
gives a voice to “students whose multilayered and often contradictory. .
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.experiences [do] not fit easily into the master narrative of a monolithic
culture.”246
D.

Comparative Social Psychology – East/West Differences

Relevant to comparative rhetoric are social psychology approaches
that connect cognition with culture. Psychology is important if we are to truly
understand other rhetorical traditions in a deep sense, on their own terms. In
this field, knowledge is gleaned through studies calculated to discern
differences in worldview, language, and communication styles which can
then be extrapolated to form generalities about different cultures.247 Richard
Nisbett, a social psychology professor at the University of Michigan is a
pioneer in this field.248 Nisbett’s contributions focus on identifying
differences in how Asians (including Korea, Japan, and China) and
Westerners perceive and think about the world.249 Nisbett’s The Geography
of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently. . . and Why
identifies differences in ways of reasoning and knowing between East and
West.250 Although Nisbett sometimes engages in the fallacy of placing
Western traditions above Eastern traditions,251 overall, the book covers real
cultural differences in a sensitive and respectful way. Nisbett’s book contains
a treasure trove for scholars interested in teaching and learning about legal
rhetoric, as so much of what Nisbett describes functions in opposition or
polarity to the way Western-influenced legal reasoning works in the U.S.
A key takeaway from Nisbett’s book is that economic or
environmental factors can affect cognitive habits. Field dependence is one
such example. Field dependence is measured by how well one can discern an
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embedded figure in a larger visual scene.252 In one famous study, subjects
were asked to look at an image containing a figure embedded in a scene;
people from agricultural environments had more trouble identifying the
embedded image than individuals living in hunting and gathering or industrial
societies. 253 In an agricultural economy, people must pay more attention to
social roles and obligations than people living in a more individualistic
hunting and gathering society.
Thus, a greater amount of cognitive energy devoted to the social field
gives rise to field dependence, more difficulty parsing out individual items in
a complex scene. 254 Other scientists have theorized that levels of field
dependence correlate to how much social hierarchy exists in a society.255 For
instance, psychology Professor Zachary Dershowitz analyzed field
dependence of Orthodox Jewish boys (conservative social boundaries),
reformed Jewish boys, and protestant boys. The psychologist found that the
Orthodox Jewish boys exhibited the most field dependence.256
After explaining the social science supporting the culture/cognition
connection, Nisbett tackles some of the large metaphysical distinctions
between the East and the West.257 As a springboard, Nisbett begins with the
observation that Asians generally see the world as a complex world that is
always moving, whereas Westerners tend to see the world as a series of
discrete unmoving objects.258 Westerners see the individual as having
discrete rights whereas Asians see rights as belonging to the entire
community.259 Applying the theory that the environment can influence
cognitive habits, Nisbett traces these differences back to historical differences
between China and Greece (as the cradle of Western reasoning), with China
being more dependent on a farming economy that required social cooperation
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whereas Greece was more dependent on fishing and herding, more
individualistic activities.260
Psychology studies indicate that generally, Asians pay more attention
to the holistic context of what they are seeing than Westerners do. In one
study, Japanese and American subjects were asked to look at an animated
vignette of a fish pond.261 When asked to describe what they saw, the
Japanese subjects focused on how big the pond was.262 The Americans
focused on the one big fish in the pond.263 In another study, Japanese and
American children were shown objects that could be categorized based on
shape or substance.264 The study involved three objects: a porcelain lemon
juicer, pieces of porcelain, and a lemon juicer made out of wood. 265 American
children grouped the two lemon juicers together, whereas the Japanese
children responded at chance levels, selecting either the other juicer or the
porcelain pieces.266 The cognitive distinction points to a cultural difference
but also to a linguistic one––the Japanese language “provides no guidance as
to whether simple objects should be seen as objects or substances.”267 For
Nisbett, this specific study illustrates that “Westerner and Asians literally see
different worlds.”268
Overall, Asian societies are considered a high context society,
meaning that individuals perceive of themselves and others in the specific
260
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context of a situation.269 For instance, an Asian person might say that he/she
is a serious person when he/she is at work, whereas a Westerner may just say,
unequivocally that he/she is a serious person.270 In a low-context society such
as the U.S., the individual is seen as a “bounded, impermeable free agent”
whereas in a high-context society, people are “connected, fluid, and [their
identity] is conditional” on the context.271 This difference in context also
explains why and how Asians don’t have the same reference points for
“individualism” as Westerners do.272 When evaluating an event involving a
person, Asians focus more heavily on a person’s circumstances than
Westerners. For instance, when a Chinese graduate student shot his faculty
advisor at the University of Iowa in 1991, U.S. media outlets reported on the
student’s alleged personality defects whereas Chinese media outlets focused
on the situation––the student’s relationships, his stress-levels, and his access
to firearms.273
Asians also approach history in a more contextualized way.274
Japanese history teachers ask their students to imagine the “mental and
emotional states of historical figures by thinking about the analogy between
their situations and situations of the students’ everyday lives.”275 History
students are considered skillful when they can empathize with the historical
figures they are studying.276 In contrast, U.S. history emphasizes factual
outcomes and causal factors in a fairly abstract fashion (The Roman Empire
collapsed for three main reasons).277 Nisbett theorizes that the Western
approach to history, which evaluates the past for cause and effect, matches
up with a worldview that assumes that individuals have control over their
destiny.278
Moving from approaches to history education to broader
generalizations, because their worldview emphasizes dynamism and cyclical
patterns, Asians generally believe that individuals don’t have control over
269
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much.279 In response to a change in circumstances, Asians tend to adapt
themselves to the situation rather than trying to control the external event that
is happening.280 This fundamental difference in Asian and Western thinking
elucidates a very different approach to knowledge based on categories.
Westerners generally believe that the world is relatively simple, that material
objects can be analyzed in isolation, and that outcomes are highly subject to
personal control.281 Categorization is based on the idea that the things in the
world are static. These thought patterns date back to the Greeks, who took
pleasure in a linear process of categorization at abstract levels.282 The ancient
Chinese, however, rejected abstract categorization schemes and often
categorized using a logic of contradiction.283 For example, in The Tao Te
Ching, an ancient Chinese poet wrote:
The five colors cause one’s eyes to be blind
The five tones cause one’s ears to be deaf
The five flavors cause one’s palate to be
spoiled284
The ancient Chinese poet rejected categories for their own sake because
breaking the world down into atomistic categories fractures the world in a
negative, unnatural way.285 For the Chinese, relationships and similarities
between categories were more analytically important than whether or not
something fit into a particular category.286 Ancient Chinese thinkers divided
the world into five core processes––spring, east, wood, wind, and green.287
Each of these processes are ineluctably influenced by the others. For Chinese
knowledge, this “multiple echo” effect was the thing to study, as opposed to
the task of putting various objects into the right categorical box, which was
of most interest to ancient Greek thinkers.288
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Cultural differences in categorization approaches are also visible
when social scientists look at how children are acculturated by their parents.
In general, Asian children learn how to categorize later than Western
children.289 Asian mothers exhibit a relational approach to objects when they
talk to their children, saying things like “the toy is crying because you threw
it.”290 On the other hand, Western mothers can be heard asking their children
to identify an object and its color.291 In one study, Western and Asian children
were presented with images of grass, a chicken, and a cow and asked to select
the two that should be grouped together.292 A majority of the Asian children
selected the cow and the grass because cows eat grass.293 A majority of the
Western children grouped the chicken and the cow together because they are
both animals.294 This study shows that for Asians, relational aspects tend to
be more important for categorization decisions than they are for Westerners.
That Asian children are encouraged to consider relational aspects
carries through to adulthood, where there is evidence that, in general, Asians
are more attuned to the emotional states of others than Westerners are.295
With respect to categorization versus relational analysis, there are also
linguistic effects. Western parents and children can be described as “noun
obsessed,” as nouns are necessary to categorize.296 Western children learn
nouns faster than they learn verbs.297 On the other hand, Asian children learn
verbs and nouns at about the same rate, sometimes they learn verbs faster.298
There are also important differences in the languages themselves. Asian
languages do not generally have a mechanism for making an adjective into a
noun (i.e. darkness) like Indo-European languages.299 English is a subject
289
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prominent language (it is more specific), whereas Asian languages are topicprominent.300 A Western person may remark that Aspen, Colorado is a great
place to go skiing. An Asian person may express the same thought as “This
place, skiing is good.”301
Further, Asians don’t often categorize something as good or bad,
rather, an event can be good, in a moment, but it can easily turn into
something bad.302 Nisbett provides a famous Chinese parable to illustrate this
point.303 When a farmer’s horse ran away, his neighbors came to offer
sympathy.304 The farmer responded by saying, why offer sympathy, because
who knows if my runaway horse is a good or bad thing?305 A few days later,
the runaway horse returned with a wild horse.306 When the neighbors came
to congratulate the farmer, he replied that this too was not clearly a good or
bad thing.307 Then, the farmer’s son rode the wild horse but was thrown,
breaking his leg.308 And then, a few days later, military officers came to the
down to draft young men for the army, but spared the farmer’s son on account
of his broken leg.309 And so on. The parable illustrates the Asian worldview
of ever-changing events and the impossibility of capturing a conclusion in a
static way.
This classic Asian parable also illustrates cultural differences in
approaches to narratives. As Westerners, we expect stories to have a
beginning, a middle, and an end.310 Generally, Westerners prefer an ending
that resolves conflict. But in general, Asians expect many different reversals
of fortune, and have no particular desire for a linear narrative that proceeds
neatly from A to B.311 Instead, Asians aesthetically engage with
300
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contradictions and multiple views, trying to either resolve each perspective
and seeing the truth in both.312 Instead of A is correct and B is incorrect, the
Asian approach might be to say that A is right and B is not wrong.313 Or, A
is right, for the time being, but B might be correct in a different situation.314
Asians are comfortable engaging with multiple pieces of information
whereas Westerners traditionally home in on one item.315 Asians tend to see
multiple, sometimes conflicting causal factors whereas Americans focus on
a single factor.316 In one study, when Asians and Americans were presented
with human faces, Asians tended to see both positive and negative emotions
in a face, whereas Americans only saw one kind of emotion, positive or
negative.317 In a similar vein, when a scientist provided Koreans and
Americans with one hundred pieces of information related to a news story
about a murder, the Americans thought that 45% of the informational items
was relevant, whereas the Koreans thought that 63% of the information items
was relevant.318 This study illustrates that Asians emphasize a greater amount
of context and factors, whereas Westerners tend to simplify the analysis to a
fewer number of brass tacks.
E.

East/West Takeaways for Legal Rhetoric

Comparative rhetoric and comparative social psychology present a
trove of cultural kernels that can be applied to rethink or remodel aspects of
U.S. legal reasoning. While an entire article could be written on East/West
differences in communication and their applications for legal rhetoric, there
are six takeaways worth mentioning here:
•

Western legal rhetoricians should always rethink either-or dichotomy
and try approaching a problem by understanding that an outcome may

312

Id. at 173-74 (explaining that Asians prefer wisdom literature (proverbs)
that contain contradiction, like “half a loaf is better than none” or “a man is
stronger than iron and weaker than a fly.”)
313
Id. at 176.
314
Id.
315
Id. at 19, 21-22, 24.
316
Id. at 205-206.
317
Id. at 187 (citing Kaiping Peng et al., Culture and Judgment of Facial
Expression (unpublished manuscript).
318
Id. at 129 (citing Incheol Choi et al., Culture and Judgment of Causal
Relevance, 84 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 46 (2003).

50
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3786244

be neither good, nor bad, but there might be a middle way319 that
reconciles each side. Looking at a problem from multiple angles,
instead of just one view, may also lead to increased wisdom.320
•

Legal rhetoricians should become attuned to Asian wisdom that
things cannot be fully understood in isolation and that context matters
greatly. Indeed, critical race theorists have long advocated that the
law take more context into account.321

•

Law advocates should re-consider categories a from relational
standpoint. For instance, is it possible to re-organize facts and
problems based on relational aspects, as oppose to the way the law
has always classed the information?322

•

Inspired by Asian linguistics, which favor verbs over nouns,323 legal
advocates can brainstorm their theory and theme of the case using
only action verbs as a starting point.

•

Legal analysts should embrace complexity and understand that
concepts can be linked with more than one factor or cause. For
instance, many legal writers engage with information discretely,
describing case A, then case B, then case C. The writer then applies
each case to the facts in linear succession. This is a classic Western
way of doing analysis. An alternative approach, however, might
synthesize the underlying inputs together and reason from there. True
synthesis results in more sophisticated legal analysis and argument.
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•

Finally, law advocates can and should revise their understanding of
narrative and story and realize that not all cultures respond
aesthetically to information that is put in a beginning, middle, and end
framework. Asian rhetorical culture places aesthetic emphasis on
multiple turns and reversals as well as contradiction. Creating
narratives with more dynamic frameworks might enliven one’s legal
advocacy while also creating cross-cultural appeal.
III.

Specific Lessons on Alternative Processes
and Alternative Legal Rhetoric

Do other cultures have better ways of speaking and arguing that
produce more justice and less inequality? This section of the paper explores
this question, identifying possible sources for the new discipline of
comparative legal rhetoric beyond the more obvious feeder disciplines
discussed above. Here, there is a distinction between rhetoric as a way of
speaking and the specific process that a culture uses, which can frame a way
of speaking. This part of the paper addresses three major sources of
alternative rhetorical knowledge: (1) anthropology and ethnography, (2)
Navajo legal rhetoric, and (3) various microrhetorics within mainstream
U.S. culture. All of these sources support different ways of speaking and
knowing that contrast with a traditional rhetorical approach. Within these
areas, this paper aims to identify sources of knowledge but also establish
areas for future inquiry, recognizing that this is just the start.
A.

Anthropology and Ethnology

Is there rhetoric wisdom to be gained from studying other cultures?
Howard University Law Professor Harold McDougall opines that small
groups are better at social justice work, pointing out that in human history, it
is when humans organize themselves into larger groups that hierarchy,
inequality, and injustice become a problem.324 McDougall raises the theory
that in ancient societies, women and men were equal, but men quickly moved
to subordinate women.325 Men then acted to create class-based status
differences based on the idea that some men were superior to others.326
McDougal theorizes that returning civic culture to small group units such as
324
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people’s assemblies might “create solidarity, self-help, and cooperative
options.”327 This would be an example of a process that might produces new
rhetoric strategies that in turn produces more justice and more equality.328
Here, the inquiry is whether or not anthropological approaches can generate
new ideas about rhetoric. Following Professor McDougal’s train of thought,
there are non-Western cultures that are matriarchal and/or egalitarian.329
What rhetorical knowledge can we learn from studying egalitarian cultures
through an anthropological lens?
Law and anthropology has been done before, illustrated in the midcentury work of anthropologist E. Adamson Hoebel. Hoebel studied
anthropology at Columbia University under Franz Boas, a progenitor of
American anthropology (Boas also taught famed anthropologists Margaret
Mead and Zora Neale Hurston).330 While studying anthropology at Columbia,
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Hoebel took law courses from famed legal realist Karl Llewellyn.331
Influenced by Professor Llewellyn, Hoebel studied non-Western cultures
with the aim of identifying norms and practices that could be viewed as
having the force of law.332
Hoebel’s work could connect egalitarian cultures with new rhetorical
knowledge, as many of the cultures that Hoebel wrote about were egalitarian,
in the sense that they did not have rigid social structures.333 Unfortunately,
Hoebel’s analysis often becomes mired in Eurocentric, elitist, racist, and
sexist bias; he clearly believed the White and Western way of doing things
was superior. For example, he referred to the Kiowa process of mediating
disputes (wronged individuals displayed anger and emotion until there was a
resolution) as an “inherently defective” way to solve problems.334 He
referred to Ashanti matrilineal culture as a “shibboleth of ignorance.”335 And
he described Ifugao men accused of rape as “poor chap[s]. . . with a tough
time knowing whether the girl is putting on an act (by saying no) or is really
fending him off.”336 Hoebel’s book title––Law of Primitive Man: A Study in
Comparative Legal Dynamics––speaks for itself, problematically.
Nonetheless, after taking time to contemplate how scholarly knowledge,
infected with sexism, racism, and elitism, becomes monumentalized in the
work of scholars like Hoebel, we can still mine his work for value.
There are, in fact, some useful kernels in Hoebel’s work. Eskimo
public confessions, where villagers collectively confessed to wrongs and
collectively obtain forgiveness, is an interesting rhetorical practice that
functions as an alternative to individual shaming and atonement.337 Also
useful is Hoebel’s description of the Cheyenne approach to crime, which, like
other tribal societies, emphasized rehabilitation and reintegration rather than
331

Id. Indeed, Hoebel and Llewellyn wrote a book together, which
purported to be an ethnography of the Cheyenne people. KARL LLEWELLYN
& E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW
IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
332
E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN
COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS (Harvard 1954).
333
Id. at 81, 101, 191 (discussions of Eskimo, Ifugao, and Ashanti
societies). While these societies were egalitarian in respect to men, they
were not egalitarian at all in terms of relations between the sexes.
334
Id. at 172-173.
335
Id. at 188-189.
336
Id. at 119-120.
337
Id. at 71.
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punishment and vengeance.338 Also interesting was the Ifugao people’s use
of a monkalun, an individual to facilitate dispute resolutions without
arbitrating them.339 The monkalun clearly mirrors modern mediation
processes in the law, although such processes were not known in Hoebel’s
time.340
With a more critical and reflective lens, comparative rhetoric scholars
might glean wisdom from indigenous cultures that are structured in
egalitarian ways.341 Iroquois342 society, for instance, differed from U.S.
society, in that women had complete control over the household, personal
property in the household, and the land.343 While the Iroquois did not consider
land as something that could be individually owned, women, not men, were
vested with the responsibility for controlling, cultivating, and stewarding
land.344 Iroquois women also held a tremendous amount of political power,
with the exclusive ability to appoint and remove clan chiefs (sachems).345
Iroquois women also had decisional authority to wage or refrain from waging
war.346 With respect to rhetoric, Iroquois women voiced their opinions in a
skillful way, taking special care to warn sachems who were not leading the
clan effectively.347 Iroquois women crafted their warnings with a strong sense
of decorum so that they would be respected.348 Iroquois women participated
in council meetings although sometimes they chose a male speaker through
which they would voice their opinions.349 The visible strength of women in
338

Id. at 152-53; see also notes 513-530 and surrounding text.
Id. at 126.
340
Hoebel insultingly dismisses the Ifugao monkalum process: “of true
juridical process [the Ifugao] have not a glimmer.” Id.
341
See Natsu Taylor Saito, Different Paths, 1 J.L. POL. ECON. 46, 50 (2020)
(recognizing that many indigenous societies have more “reciprocal and also
much more fluid” understandings of social organization, especially
gendered relations).
342
The Iroquois were comprised of the Onondaga, Oneida, Seneca, Cayuga,
and Mohawk people. They lived in the Northeast United States and in
Canada. Baskin, supra note 329, at 43.
343
Id. at 44.
344
Id.
345
Id.
346
Id. at 45
347
Id. at 44. (An erring sachem was entitled to three warnings before being
removed).
348
Id.
349
Id.
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55
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3786244

Iroquois society inspired women like Elizabeth Cady Stanton to push forward
with a suffragist agenda.350
Unfortunately, the influence of Anglo law and culture changed
Iroquois society and made it more patriarchal and patrilineal.351 An 1869
Canadian Act declared that “any Indian women marrying any other than an
Indian shall cease to be an Indian, . . . nor shall the children of such a marriage
be considered as an Indian.”352 Similar laws were enacted in the U.S.353 These
forced assimilationist changes make it difficult to actually locate and study
Iroquois rhetoric. Nonetheless, there are pockets of Iroquois people, so-called
“longhouse Iroquois” that reject Eurocentric values and continue to abide by
traditional female-oriented rules.354 Future studies into this space could be
highly fruitful.355 For such a project, the comparatist should consult
anthropology scholars like Audra Simpson (of Mohawk) 356 and MichelRolph Trouillot (Haitian),357 both of whom have written lucidly about giving
subjects “literary sovereignty”358 by enabling the first-person voice and
rejecting the “us and all of them” binary that privileges Western knowledge
as superior to all others.359
Similar to the Iroquois, the Navajo Nation, whose rhetoric is
discussed more in depth below, also adheres to matrilocal and matrilineal
forms of social organization. 360 In a matrilocal family, daughters continue to
live with their parents and unmarried siblings; their husbands come to reside
350

Sally Roesch Wagner, Iroquois Women Inspire 19th Century Feminists,
PEACE COUNCIL NET, http://www.peacecouncil.net/noon/iroquois-womeninspire-19th-century-feminists-by-sally-roesch-wagner (originally published
in the Summer 1999 issue of NOW (National Organization of Women)
Times).
351
Baskin, supra note 329, at 45.
352
Id.; see also AUDRA SIMPSON, MOHAWK INTERRUPTUS: POLITICAL LIFE
ACROSS THE BORDERS OF SETTLER STATES 108 (Duke 2014).
353
Baskin, supra note 329, at 46.
354
Id.
355
However, it is not entirely clear what such a study would produce. Just
because a culture is broadly egalitarian along gender-lines does not mean
that its rhetoric mirrors or represents the culture’s social structure.
356
See SIMPSON, supra note 352, at 95-113;
357
See MICHEL-ROLPH TROUILLOT, GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS (2003).
358
SIMPSON, supra note 352, at 105.
359
ROLPH-TROUILLOT, supra note 357, at 27.
360
See Mary Shepardson, The Status of Navajo Women, 6 AM. INDIAN
QUART. 149 (1982).
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with them.361 In the family, decision-making is egalitarian with an emphasis
on individual autonomy.362 Navajo matrilineal tradition provides that the
family descends from the mother and becomes part of her clan. Like Iroquois
culture, U.S. interference has attenuated Navajo women’s traditionally high
status. In the 1800s and 1900s, the Board of Indian Affairs (BIA) attempted
to civilize the Navajo people by ignoring matrilineal clan designations,
assigning the patronym of the father to the child, and grouping household
members under a male head in its registration procedures.363 In addition, land
reforms aimed at reducing the livestock population (stock reduction) harmed
Navajo women, taking away their livelihood (livestock cultivation) and
forcing them into wage-labor, where they did not fare as well as men.364
Nonetheless, in more recent years, the traditionally high status of Navajo
women has recovered from losses that occurred during stock reduction and
BIA rule.365
Gender hierarchy is just one example of the Navajo Nation’s more
egalitarian and more holistic approach to social organization. The Navajo
Nation also has a rich body of jurisprudence in the form of written legal
opinions, which can be studied for their alternative approaches to legal
rhetoric and legal understanding. As Natsu Taylor Saito has cogently written,
“[t]hose of us steeped in colonial cultures can learn a great deal from
perspectives that remain ‘outside the logic of possession,’ while remaining
mindful that such ways of understanding are grounded, quite literally, in
space or place, and, therefore, cannot be universalized.”366 In terms of
learning from indigenous rhetoric, Navajo legal rhetoric offers a trove of
lessons. Studied through its written judicial opinions, Navajo legal rhetoric
emphasizes process over rules; elevates care and restoration over retribution
and incarceration; and privileges consensus over top-down decisions made
by one individual. Navajo jurisprudence is where we now turn.
B.

Indigenous Rhetoric: Navajo Jurisprudence

Navajo legal rhetoric serves as a helpful example of legal rhetoric that
exists separate and apart from our Anglo system.367 A thorough study of
361

Id. at 150.
Id.
363
Id. at 160.
364
Id. 151-153.
365
Id. at 162, 167.
366
Saito, supra note 341, at 61.
367
This is a topic that I briefly addressed in my article Neurorhetoric, Race,
and the Law, supra note 21, at 692, n. 17. In researching and writing on
362
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Navajo rhetoric is beyond the scope of this article; indeed, to truly study
Navajo rhetoric, one would need to travel to the jurisdiction, sit in on court
proceedings, and really immerse oneself in the jurisprudence.368 For purposes
of this article’s more limited study, I will review emblematic decisions that
showcase the Navajo Nation’s approach to legal rhetoric and legal problemsolving.369
Since the creation of its Supreme Court in 1958, the Navajo Nation
has produced a significant amount of legal jurisprudence in the form of
written decisions.370 Through these written decisions, previously unwritten
customs were codified and institutionalized; norms and values became tribal
common law.371 The Navajo word for law, beehaz’áaníi, refers to a higher
law, something “way at the top” that corresponds roughly to the Anglo
concept of natural law.372 The Navajo Nation Code of Judicial conduct
mandates that Navajo judges apply Navajo concepts to adjudicate issues.373
Navajo judges should “apply Navajo concepts and procedures of justice,
including the principles of maintaining harmony, establishing order,
respecting freedom, and talking things out in free discussion.”374 Disputes
can be resolved in a traditional litigation format, through the Navajo tribal
court system, or the parties might select a peacemaking process to resolve
their dispute.375

this issue, I was inspired by Prof. Gabrielle Stafford’s brilliant presentation
on indigenous law and indigenous rhetoric at the Fifth Applied Storytelling
Conference at City University Law School, London, U.K.
368
I hope to engage in such a project in the very near future.
369
I sourced most of these decisions from a comprehensive law review
article that traces the evolution of Navajo jurisprudence. Daniel L. Lowery,
Developing a Tribal Common Law Jurisprudence: The Navajo Experience,
1969-1992, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 379 (1993).
370
Bennett v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90, 18
Indian L. Rep. 6009, 6010 (Nav. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 1990) (discussing the
chronology for the establishment of the Navajo Supreme Court).
371
Lowery, supra note 369, at 381.
372
Id. at 390.
373
Navajo Nation Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1 (1998).
374
Id.
375
Id. at 628-629; Lowery, supra note 369, at 383-84; James W. Zion, The
Navajo Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old and Accommodation to
the New, 11 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 89, 89-92 (1983).
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Before studying individual Navajo opinions, it is helpful to consider
the worldview, or nomos,376 of Navajo jurisprudence. One of the keys to
Navajo jurisprudence is the concept of sa’ah naaghái bik’eh hózho, a concern
for harmony within and in connection to the physical/spiritual world.377 An
alternative to rugged individualism, the Navajo approach to law and problemsolving emphasizes “respect, reference, kindness, and cooperation.”378
Whereas U.S. legal culture treats the law as something to be applied to solve
an individual problem, Navajo law, and North American indigenous systems
in general, treats law as a “way of life. . .[believing] that justice is a part of
the life process.”379 Also relevant is the characterization of the Navajo legal
system as robustly participatory, all Navajos––men and women––have long
been expected to participate in decision-making.380 In comparison to the
U.S./Anglo legal system, the Navajo approach can be described as holistic
rather than atomistic, participatory and horizonal rather than top-down. As
will be explored below, these mindset differences produce discernable
differences in the legal rhetoric.
In reading Navajo court decisions, one of the first rhetorical
differences of note is the amalgamated nature of the legal reasoning. As a
“micro-jurisdiction,”381 Navajo law combines Anglo-American and
376

Nomos is the “the normative universe” where rhetoric functions and is
commonly understood by the audience. Chubb, Still Writing at the Master’s
Table, supra note 98, at 258.
377
James W. Zion, Navajo Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 18 TOURO L. REV.
563, 603 (2015) (The acronym SNBH is often used to refer to this concept)
[hereinafter Zion, Navajo Therapeutic Jurisprudence]. See also Gerry
Philipsen, Navajo World View and Culture Patterns of Speech: A Case
Study in Ethnorhetoric, 39 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 132, 133 (1972) (The
Navajo mindset views the world is an “inherently harmonious order of
causally related things and occurrences.”).
378
Id. at 607.
379
Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society,
available at http://www.aidainc.net/Publications/ij_systems.htm
380
Bennett v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90, 18
Indian L. Rep. 6009, 6011 (Nav. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 1990) (placing the
Navajo legal system in a political and historical context).
381
Here, I use the term “micro-jurisdiction” to refer to a small area with
some independent sovereignty that is ensconced or within a larger
jurisdiction, areas like Seychelles (with a legal system influenced by both
common and civil law traditions). See Tony Angelo, From Code Noir to
Entrenched Rights, 50 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 359, 368, n.1 (2019)
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indigenous reasoning. Navajo judges “are in the often untenable position of
reconciling two competing philosophies in the courtroom.”382 The written
court decisions, however, often turn on precise Navajo concepts, which are
written in the Navajo language and orthography. Although the concepts are
subsequently translated into English, the Navajo concept is the primary text
that propels the concept.
In reading the written decisions, one sees how Navajo legal
principles operate in contradistinction to legal formalism, which uses a rigid
syllogistic structure with a narrow rule, application, and conclusion. Instead
of looking to see how the rule applies to the facts in a narrow fashion, a
Navajo appellate judge looks to see if the process aligns with Navajo values
and principles. If these values are violated, a judicial decision that would
have passed muster under a formalistic analysis is reversed or modified. For
instance, in Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Duncan, a financial servicing
company acted to foreclose on the defendant’s mobile home. The defendant
counterclaimed with claims of fraud, intentional emotional distress,
harassment, and assault.383 There was an arbitration clause in the financing
agreement that contained, in all capital letters, language indicating that the
parties voluntarily and knowingly waived their right to a jury trial. The
court held, despite the clear waiver language in the agreement, that the
clause violated the Navajo principle of nábináheezlágo be t’áá lahjį algha’
deet’ą, which conditions enforcement of an agreement only if all
participants agree that all concerns or issues have been addressed in the
agreement.384
The Green Tree court also found that the waiver language did not
comply with the Navajo concepts of ííshjáni àdoonííł, the necessity of
making something clear or obvious, and házhó’ógó, which requires a
“patient, respectful discussion. . . before a waiver is effective.”385 The
Navajo Supreme Court framed házhó’ógó not as a rule to be applied, but as
a “fundamental tenet informing us how we must approach each other as

(citing Mathilda Twomey, Legal Metissage in a Micro-Jurisdiction: The
Mixing of Common Law and Civil Law in Seychelles, 6 COMPARATIVE LAW
JOURNAL OF THE PACIFIC 1 (2017).
382
Manning v. Abeita, slip op., No. SC-CV-66-08 7 (Nav. Sup. Ct 2011).
383
Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Duncan, slip op., No. SC-CV-46-05 at 1
(Navajo Supreme Court August 18, 2008)
384
Id. at 7-8.
385
Id. at 10, 11.
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individuals.”386 Accordingly, the Navajo Supreme Court found the
arbitration clause unenforceable based on Navajo legal principles.
Rhetorically, the Green Tree opinion stands out because the legal
principles are not just abstract rules, but instead are deep-seated principles
that impact the entire Navajo community. By comparison, the U.S.
approach to arbitration clauses is visible in a run-of-the-mill Federal case
from the Sixth Circuit.387 In that case, Rowan v. Brookdale Senior Living
Communities, Inc., the plaintiffs argued that an assisted living facility’s
arbitration clause and jury waiver clause were unenforceable under
Michigan law. The Sixth Circuit decided otherwise, stating that Michigan
law “‘presumes that one who signs a written agreement knows the nature of
the instrument,’ and a signatory ‘will not be heard to say, when enforcement
is sought, that he did not read it, or that he supposed it was different in its
terms.’”388 The U.S. Supreme Court stated the concept similarly:
[I]t will not do for a man to enter into a
contract, and, when called upon to respond to
its obligations, to say that he did not read it
when he signed it, or did not know what it
contained. If this were permitted, contracts
would not be worth the paper on which they
are written. But such is not the law. A
contractor must stand by the words of his
contract; and, if he will not read what he signs,
he alone is responsible for his omission.389
In contrast to the Navajo approach of framing the principle of agreement in
terms of a conversation and discussion that takes place mindful of
community bonds and enduring social relations, the mainstream U.S.
approach places all of the burden to know and understand on the individual
alone. The Navajo concept of házhó’ógó places the burdens on both sides;
the party seeking to enforce an arbitration cause has a duty to make these
clear and understandable to the person signing the document.390 Within the
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Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added).
I chose the Sixth Circuit here to illustrate because that is the jurisdiction
in which I reside.
388
647 F. App’x 607, 611 (internal citations omitted).
389
Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50, 23 L. Ed. 203 (1875)
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Green Tree, slip op., No. SC-CV-46-05 at 10, 11.
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U.S, a person signing an agreement, even if they cannot read the language,
has an absolute duty to ascertain the meaning of the language:
Thus, where a person cannot read
the language in which a contract is written, it
is ordinarily as much the person's duty to
procure someone to read and explain it to him
or her before signing it as it would be to read it
before the person signed it if he or she were
able so to do, and his or her failure to obtain a
reading and an explanation of it is such
negligence as will estop the person to avoid it
on the ground that he or she was ignorant of its
contents.391
From a simple linguistic standpoint, the Navajo decisions routinely use the
plural first person (we) and consistently frame principles as collective
maxims. The U.S. approach, just in viewing this example, relies heavily on
singular third person pronouns, often male gendered.
Navajo decisions are also written in such a way to explicitly reject
Anglo legal norms when they conflict with Navajo principles. For instance,
in Watson v. Watson, a dispute concerning past-due alimony and child
support amounts, the ex-wife requested that the ex-husband obtain a life
insurance policy to guarantee the payment of the alimony, in the event that
he died.392 In most U.S. jurisdictions, this is a routine post-divorce remedy
designed to secure one party’s (usually the ex-wife’s) entitlement to postdivorce spousal support (usually from the ex-husband).393 The Navajo
391

17A C.J.S. Contracts § 211.
Slip op., No. SC-CV-40-07 (Navajo Supreme Court Jan. 21, 2010).
393
See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.08 (West) (“To the extent necessary to
protect an award of alimony, the court may order any party who is ordered
to pay alimony to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or
to otherwise secure such alimony award with any other assets which may be
suitable for that purpose.”); Braun v. Braun, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 1118, 907
N.E.2d 682 (2009) (“It is within the discretion of the judge to order the
husband to maintain life insurance as security for alimony even where, as
here, the order for alimony does not continue after the husband's death.”);
Hawkins v. Hawkins, 268 Ga. 637, 638, 491 S.E.2d 806, 807–08 (1997)
(“We conclude that the trial court made a valid award of
periodic alimony when it required the husband to maintain
a life insurance policy for five years for the benefit of his former wife.”);
392
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Supreme Court soundly rejected the concept of a life insurance policy,
opining that it represented diné biz nídizin, “the notion of wishing ill-will or
early death on an individual.”394 The court explicitly noted that while the
life-insurance policy was a “bilagaana [U.S./Anglo] way of making
arrangement for payment of indebtedness,” it represented an “uncouth and
especially vulgar” approach to Diné [traditional Navajo] values. The court
went so far as to declare the practice and request as yówéé át’áo––
“unbelievable.”395 Accordingly, the Watson court denied the request that the
ex-husband take out an insurance policy. Because the life insurance policy
practice conflicted so deeply with Diné values, the Watson court devoted a
significant amount of text to repudiating the practice with direct and
unapologetic language interwoven with Navajo concepts. The Watson
court’s lucid explanation reinforced Navajo values and excised U.S. values
as inapplicable to the situation.
Sometimes Navajo decisions operate on an additional meta-level in
that they specifically define what an effective resolution process looks like.
For instance, in Ashkii v. Kayenta Family Court, the parties were in a
dispute over child custody.396 The lower court ordered each party to pay
$1,000 to a third-party child custody evaluator who would recommend an
outcome.397 If a party could not pay the $1,000 fee, the trial court judge
indicated that he would award custody to the opposing side.398 The Navajo
Supreme Court found that the outsourcing of the custody decision to a third
Groves v. Groves, 70 Wash. 2d 614, 616, 424 P.2d 654, 655 (1967) (“[T]he
trial court was clearly exercising sound discretion [by] securing her rights as
a beneficiary [of the life insurance policy] for a period of time. The trial
court's judgment in this respect is affirmed.
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party violated the Navajo principle of Diné bi beenahaz ‘áanii, which
encourages the parties to work out problems themselves.399 In requiring the
third-party custody evaluator, “the Family Court surrendered its sacred
responsibility to an outside custody evaluator who, more likely than not, is
unaccustomed with Diné traditional laws and values.”400 In the Navajo legal
system, process is not just a dry concept concerned with pleadings and
response times. Adhering to an authentic process is imbued with a sacred
power.401
In Manning v. Abeita, another case involving a family law alimony
issue, the Navajo Supreme Court emphasized the participatory nature of
resolving disputes, further illustrating how the Navajo legal process should
work.402 The appellant alleged that the court did not follow appropriate pretrial procedures that would have given the parties a chance to resolve the
issues in mediation. Accepting appellant’s argument, the Navajo Supreme
Court explained that Navajo justice is founded on K’é, “principles of
relationship, courtesy, and respect.”403 The trial court’s summary
adjudication of the alimony issue conflicted with the Diné resolution
process, “which does not rely on a superior decision-maker, who imposes
decisions on others. It does not use coercion or force, and is instead based
upon an agreed need for harmony in the community.”404
The Manning court reversed the trial court’s decision that was based
on a win/lose, top/down, individualistic approach and instead emphasized
the need for consensus, process, and harmony, an approach that differs
markedly from the mainstream U.S. legal system. The Watson, Manning,
and Ashkii cases surface an education campaign of sorts. These cases
function as reminders to the Navajo legal community that Navajo legal
principles must be vigilantly thought about because they are so different
from what seems natural and procedurally correct from a U.S. standpoint.
Rhetoric describing the Navajo Nation’s horizontal and consensusbased process is also discernible in Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, where the
399

Id. at 1-4.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
401
An inquiry into the sacred roots of U.S./Anglo law is beyond the scope
of this paper, but U.S. law descends from the British common law, which
rested on theocratic principles. Sacred principles reside in U.S. law in some
corners.
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appellant, a well-known tribal leader, appealed his convictions for bribery
and fraud, arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.405
The Navajo Supreme Court described the correct process in terms of the
“affected individuals ‘talking’ about the offense and the offender to resolve
the problem.”406 As the court explained, effective legal rhetoric is less about
“winning” and more about guiding the participants:
The effectiveness of the speaker (and there
could be more than one) was measured by what
the speaker said. If the speaker spoke wisely
and with knowledge while persuading others in
their search for consensus, that indicated
effectiveness. If the speaker hesitated, was
unsure, or failed to move the others, that
person was not a good speaker and was thus
ineffective.407
In evaluating appellant’s counsels’ performance, the Navajo Supreme Court
found that they spoke “wisely, and with knowledge, consistent with a
traditional Navajo ‘talking things out’ session.”408 The appellant also
received effective counsel because “[p]lanning is an important Navajo value,
and the record show[ed] that the defense was prepared and planned well.”409
In contrast to the Navajo conception of effective assistance of counsel, the
mainstream U.S. standard for ineffective assistance of counsel rests on an
adversarial foundation; a lawyer is ineffective only if his/her lack of skill and
effort fails to “render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.”410
In contrast to the crucible style of justice that pervades the U.S.
system, the MacDonald decision stressed a different sort of process. At the
end of the appellate opinion, the Navajo Supreme Court made a remarkable
conclusion statement:
We have approached our task with respect for
leadership and the honor due a public figure.
We have assessed the law and evidence as
405

Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, No. A-CR-09-90, 19 I.L.R. 6053, 605354, 6056-6055 (Navajo Supreme Court 1991).
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judges, and we have reviewed the ‘talking’
about our former leader as Navajos. We have
strived to carry out our duties as required by
law. The events which have culminated in this
decision have tried us all, but the lesson it
teaches is, the Navajo Nation will survive as a
government of law, nourished by the values,
morals, and ideals of equality and sharing
which have made Navajo society unique and
valuable.
Here, the Navajo Supreme Court framed the consensus-seeking process as
more important to the conception of justice than the end result (affirm, deny,
guilty, not-guilty). The question was not whether or not the assistance of
counsel was “reasonable” in an adversarial courtroom battle,411 but whether
or not counsel engendered an effective process, a “talking-it-out” session. In
concluding its opinion in this manner, the MacDonald court both affirmed
the trial court’s jury verdict as correct, but also reinforced the importance of
the process, breaking the fourth wall and remarking on the process’s trying
nature, for all involved. It is difficult to imagine a U.S. federal Judge making
similar remarks or using a similar voice. In this way, Navajo jurisprudence
offers an alternative style of judicial rhetoric that both addresses the
individual merits of a case, but also explicitly recognizes the communitarian
values that require a consensus-building process.
In another case, the Navajo Supreme Court had occasion to remark
on the differences between the adversarial system commonly found in the
U.S. and the Navajo method of achieving justice. In Shorty v. Greyeyes, the
appellant was jailed for contempt, for failing to pay child support.412 The
record reflected that defendant was not notified that his contempt hearing
would be converted from a civil hearing to a criminal hearing.413 The Shorty
court ruled that the contempt proceeding violated the Navajo concept
(discussed above) of ííshjáni ádoolniił, the need to make things clear.
Further, in concluding its opinion, the Shorty court explicitly pointed out the
tension between the power of a court to jail an individual for contempt and
Navajo principles, which proceed on a different axis:
411

Id. at 687 (“[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of
reasonably effective assistance.”)
412
Shorty v. Greyeyes, slip op., No. SC-CV-06-14, 1-2 (Navajo Supreme
Court 2014).
413
Id.
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Trial courts should understand that the exercise
of contempt powers should be done with
upmost restraint. This is true in any court
system but it is particularly true in the Navajo
Court system, which prides itself on applying
restorative concepts of justice and horizontal
concepts of power. The adversarial system
which is in existence in our court system
creates tension with traditional dispute
resolution and some contempt powers may be
essential in the adversarial system, but our
courts shall limit their application by applying
Navajo concepts when applicable.414
The Shorty court supported it decision with logic and rules, but augmented
its reasoning with commentary on the proper role of the judge in the Navajo
legal system. The reference to “restorative concepts of justice and horizontal
concepts of power” is supremely at odds with the top-down conception of the
judge’s power that permeates the U.S. legal system.415 To a Western trained
lawyer, this decision presents a refreshing idea––power in a legal system
should operate in a more democratic and participatory way, and this norm is
binding; it limits an individual judge’s ability to jail a litigant for not obeying
an order.
Other notable Navajo cases surface a theme of restoration and care as
ethical principles that trump more adversarial goals. For instance, in
Haungooah v. Greyes, the defendant was jailed for violating the terms of his
parole.416 He left the Navajo jurisdiction without approval and he was found
in possession of intoxicating liquors and controlled substances.417 Defendant
was not personally served with a notice of the bench warrant for his probation
violations.418 In overturning defendant’s re-incarceration, the Haungooah
court admonished the prosecution for not approaching the case from the
perspective of need and care, opining that:

414

Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the Judge’s patriarchal role in traditional U.S.
jurisprudence, see Jewel, Reasonable Man, supra note 11.
416
Haungooah v. Greyeyes, slip op., No. SC-CV-06-13 1-2 (Nav. Sup. Ct.
2013).
417
Id.
418
Id. at 1-3.
415
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[The] prosecution. . . had the discretion and
responsibility to find a solution for Petitioner
other than seek reinstatement of his original
jail sentence. There is a duty on our
government to provide avenues for restoration.
Diné justice throws no one away.419
In Navajo law, there “is a fundamental right of our people to expect that their
governmental agencies pursue restorative measures, especially where dire
living circumstances are beyond a defendant’s control, as in this case.”420
In Re A.W. also features a rhetoric of care and restoration, this time in
the context of juvenile justice.421 In this case, the police pulled over a thirteenyear-old appellant and observed him to have liquor on his breath and twentyone beer cans in his car.422 Arraigned with no attorney present, the child pled
guilty to all offenses.423 Law enforcement called the child’s mother but did
not make any effort for her to retrieve him from custody.424 The Navajo
Supreme Court found that the child’s due process rights and right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment had been violated and that law
enforcement had failed in its duty “[t]o preserve and restore the unity of the
family whenever possible.”425 Law enforcement also failed in its duty to
“provide for the care, the protection, and wholesome mental and physical
development of those children who are detained.”426 Finally, law
enforcement did not, in accordance with the Navajo Bill of Rights section on
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, provide a “padded area to lie on, a blanket,
and food to eat.”427 The Navajo Supreme Court underscored the binding duty
the State owes all Navajo children, opining that “We as a nation must fulfill
our duty to protect our children” because “children are precious above all
else.”428

419

Id. at 6-7 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
421
No. A-CV-19-86, 15 I.L.R. 6041 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1988)
422
Id. at 6041-42.
423
Id.
424
Id.
425
Id. at 6042 (citing The Navajo Children’s Code, 9 Nav. T.C. §1001(1)
(1985 Cumm. Supp.).
426
Id.
427
Id.
428
Id. at 6042, 6043.
420
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Navajo employment law demonstrates how the state can elevate care
and communitarian goals over harsh individualism and not have the sky fall.
In Navajo law, an employment relationship can only be terminated for just
cause, in contrast to the “at-will” norm found in most U.S. jurisdictions.429 In
Hadley v. Navajo Nation Dept. of Public Safety, the appellant police officer
alleged employment discrimination.430 The Navajo Supreme Court found for
the appellant, who had demonstrated a pattern of harassment, discrimination,
and adverse discipline without just cause.431 The Hadley court’s decision
reads very similarly to federal workplace legal decisions, except for one point
regarding the burden of proof. On this point, the Hadley court explained:
[T]he burden of proof . . . is appropriately
placed on the employer to prove: nizhónigo
hahodit‘é, requiring the employer to show his
place of employment is maintained in
harmony. Much like a home, one’s place of
employment offers a family of employees
where each employee spends a considerable
part of the day with great expectations that
his/her health, safety and welfare are foremost
considerations of the employer.432
The Hadley decision analogizes the workplace to a home, with the employer
in the role of a nurturing parent. Operating at odds with mainstream U.S.
employment law, which allows an employer to terminate an employee for
any reason or no reason (except discriminatory reasons) and which places
almost all of the burden to prove discrimination on the employee,433the
Navajo legal universe elevates principles of care and nurturing over concepts
like the need to maintain flexibility over labor costs. In this way, Navajo law
and rhetoric counters the ascendant U.S. model of work and wages, which
429

Navajo Employment Preference Act, 15 N.N.C. § 604(b)(8), available at
https://www.onlr.navajonsn.gov/Portals/0/Files/Navajo%20Preference%20in%20Employment%20
Act.pdf.
430
Slip op., No. SC-CV-20-15 1-2 (Navajo Supreme Court, 2016).
431
Id. at 9-10.
432
Id. at. 9-10.
433
See, e.g., Bradley A. Areheart, Organizational Justice and Antidiscrimination, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1921, 1932 n. 55 (2020) (noting the high
burdens placed on plaintiffs seeking redress for employment
discrimination).
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places most of the economic burden on the individual employee and almost
none of the burden on the employer.434
The rhetoric found in Navajo decisions, focused on provision, care,
and restoration, is difficult to separate from Navajo law, which grants rights
and issues duties based on an ethic of care, creating a truly “responsive state”
to care for those who are not fully in control of their life situations.435 For
instance, how does one effectively speak in such a system, where the goal is
not to win, but to engender a process of restoring the accused back into the
community? Of course, lawyers advocating for poor and vulnerable persons
would thrive if given sharper tools––new positive rights and new duties to
persuasively frame. As it stands now, attorneys for vulnerable populations
must grapple with the accepted jurisprudential premise, grounded in social
Darwinism, that one’s life situation is a result of one’s choices and one’s
innate characteristics (or merit).436
At one time, however, binding principles of care and restoration
existed just beneath the surface of American jurisprudence, particularly in the
context of equal protection and welfare assistance. Dissenting in Dandridge
v. Williams, where the petitioner challenged the state of Maryland’s scheme
for allocating welfare benefits, Thurgood Marshall synthesized the preexisting law of equal protection:
[T]his Court has already recognized several
times that when a benefit, even a ‘gratuitous'
benefit, is necessary to sustain life, stricter
constitutional standards, both procedural and

434

The erasure of collective or state responsibility for individual outcomes
is a hallmark of the neoliberal ideology that is ascendant in U.S. law. See
Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory, 77 L.
CONTEMP. PROB. 71, 88 (2014).
435
The Navajo ethic of care is similar to the vulnerability theory espoused
by Prof. Martha Fineman. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable
Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010).
436
For a thorough discussion of this premise, see Jewel, Merit and
Mobility: A Progressive View of Class, Culture, and the Law, 43 UNIV. OF
MEMPHIS L. REV. 239 (2012).
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substantive, are applied to the deprivation of
that benefit.437
If Justice Marshall’s synthesis of the existing law had been accepted
and reinforced as the “rule,” then U.S. poverty jurisprudence might have
started to look more like the Navajo approach. If state action touches upon an
individual’s needs for sustenance, then we must closely scrutinize the state’s
action. However, the Dandridge majority rejected elevated constitutional
scrutiny for deprivation of benefits that touched upon sustenance and life
(such as welfare assistance for children).438 The conservative turn in poverty
happened as public animosity toward welfare grew and the Supreme Court
became more conservative and economically oriented in general.439
The Navajo approach offers a refreshing take on how the law might
care for society’s most vulnerable individuals, not just in terms of scrutiny
when a right has been infringed upon, but by placing new positive rights and
duties into the system.440 In terms of rhetoric, new rights and duties would
positively impact the types of rhetoric available in one’s advocacy toolkit. No
longer limited by dry constructs like reasonableness, rational basis, and
ends/means, advocates would be free to make concrete arguments about what
the state must do to protect and buffer its citizens. Thus, comparative legal
rhetoric is helpful for providing a vision of an alternative world, a nomos441
of what could be once a paradigm shift occurs.
C.

Micro-Rhetorics

Within mainstream Western culture, some systems resolve social
problems in ways that markedly depart from the law’s adversarial,
extroverted ways. I refer to these communication ways as micro-rhetorics,442
437

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 522, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 1180, 25 L.
Ed. 2d 491 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
438
Id. at 485.
439
See generally, Julie Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever:
Deconstitutionalizing of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, and Dialogic
Default, 629 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (2008).
440
Navajo Employment Preference Act, 15 N.N.C. § 604(b)(8), available at
https://www.onlr.navajonsn.gov/Portals/0/Files/Navajo%20Preference%20in%20Employment%20
Act.pdf.
441
See supra note 376 (defining nomos).
442
Thank you to my colleague Professor Joan Heminway for the idea of
Micro-Rhetorics as a helpful way to think about this material. I am also
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rhetorical practices that exist within a broader mainstream culture, but
contain their own rules, processes, and styles of rhetoric. Within law alone,
one could study micro-rhetoric from a variety of categorical frameworks:
litigation, transactional, or alternative dispute resolution, for instance. This
paper analyzes micro-rhetorics from a socio-cultural framework, looking at
other styles of problem solving, including the Quaker approach,
reconciliation and reintegration strategies, and participatory movements.
A synthesis of these alternate systems indicates that they are
introspective rather than extroverted; they embrace participatory goals of
giving all voices the floor rather than a top-down one speaker/many listeners
approach; and they reach for consensus rather than meting out a black-andwhite win or loss. Most of traditional legal rhetoric is based on an adversarial
contest, with one speaker (usually the lawyer) attempting to persuade several
others (the jury, a judge, a panel of judges) in order to “win.” Microrhetorics
offer alternative ways to solve problems. By studying these other ways, we
can identify and cultivate new skills for speaking, listening, and moderating
that could be useful legal advocacy tools.
i.

Quaker Rhetoric

In studying micro-rhetorics, we start with Quaker rhetoric. The
Quakers immigrated to the United States in great numbers in the 1600s and
1700s, settling in the mid-Atlantic region that now encompasses
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey.443 The Quakers had some impact
on American culture, often voicing minority viewpoints related to pacifism
and abolitionism.444 Quaker theology differs from more liturgical Christian
sects in its reliance on a theory that God is a “God of love and light whose
benevolent spirit harmonized the universe.”445 Quakers believe that every

drawing upon the micro-jurisdiction concept, of a jurisdiction that exists
within or adjacent to another jurisdiction, that draws upon multiple legal
traditions to create its own legal system. See supra, note 381.
443
DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION’S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN
AMERICA 419-421 (Kindle version 1989), https://read.amazon.com/.
444
Paula V. Lippard, The Rhetoric of Silence: The Society of Friends’
Unprogrammed Meeting for Worship, 36 COMMC’N QUART. 145, 153
(1988); Carey Brycchan, FROM PEACE TO FREEDOM: QUAKER RHETORIC
AND THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY 1657-1761 8 (Yale Univ.
Press 2012).
445
FISCHER, supra note 443, at 425. Fischer points out that the Quaker
theology was much more positive than the Puritan’s conception of a deity
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person has the capacity to experience “the inner light” or “light from within,”
a divine spirit of goodness and virtue.446
The Quaker doctrine of the inner light is mirrored in an egalitarian
communication process that gives all participants a voice.447 For instance, in
a Quaker worship service, congregants sit together in a meeting house with
no pulpit, no sermon, and no preacher; all who wish to speak can speak.448
This egalitarian worship structure is also used for Quaker business
meetings.449 The process is more important than the outcome.450 The Quaker
system is also non-adversarial451 and built on a goal of reaching a
consensus.452 For Quakers, speech has to do with generating a sense of shared
identity, cooperation, and community rather than persuading another
person.453 Even with an egalitarian view that all voices have merit, the
Quakers encouraged efficiency in their business meetings. Quaker meeting
that could terrify and do terrible things or the Anglican conception of a
deity that ruled orderly over a strict hierarchy of creatures. Id. at 425-426.
446
Id. at 426; Lippard, supra note 444, at 148.
447
Lippard, supra note 444, at 148.
448
MICHAEL J. SHEERAN, BEYOND MAJORITY RULE: VOTELESS DECISIONS
IN THE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY OF FRIENDS 4-5 (Philadelphia Yearly Meeting,
Religious Society of Friends 1983).
449
Id.
450
Elizabeth Molina-Markham, Finding The “Sense of the Meeting”:
Decision Making Through Silence Among Quakers, 78 WESTERN J. OF
COMMC’N 155, 155 (2014).
451
Brycchan, supra note 444, at 8 (noting that Quaker non-hierarchical
speech styles are revered by modern day anarchists). As a point of
convergence, when the Navajo Nation sought to institutionalize its
peacemaking process within its court system, tribal leaders found that the
Quakers had incorporated a non-adversarial peacemaking process into their
court system in 1683. James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court:
Deference to the Old and Accommodation to the New, 11 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 89, 96 (1983) (citing Scott, Fishing in Troubled Waters, FRIENDS J. 8,
9 (January 1982), https://www.friendsjournal.org/wpcontent/uploads/emember/downloads/1982/HC12-50713.pdf).
452
Brycchan, supra note 444, at 17; SHEERAN, supra note 448, at 47-48.
Although “consensus” is the concept that most fits here, the Quakers
themselves preferred the term “sense of the meeting,” believing that the
word consensus was too secular of a concept. Molina-Markham, supra note
450, at 157-58.
453
Lippard, supra note 444 at 152.
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guidelines admonish speakers not to offer repetitive remarks that others have
already stated.454
Quakers reach consensus when a “sense of the meeting” has been
reached.455 At the conclusion of a Quaker meeting, the clerk of the meeting
records a minute that reflects the meeting’s sense.456 Consensus is different
from a win/lose vote where the losers no longer have a voice. Consensus can
be thought of as the “general, though not necessarily unanimous, approval of
the group.”457 Consensus is achieved when the minority, not changing their
minds so-to-speak, nonetheless decide go along with the majority when an
agreement is ideal and the majority position is reasonable.458 When minority
voices are too loud to fade into a consensus, then the solution is to table the
discussion for the next meeting, with the hope that a sense of the meeting will
emerge with more time.459
A problem-solving system where consensus (rather than a decisive
win/lose vote) is the goal, “contrary voices [can] continue to be heard even
when the majority was against them.”460 “[N]o single perspective is imposed
on the group; rather a consensual multi-perspective is allowed to emerge,
without resort to majority opinion nor dominance of a single, strongly
advocated voice.”461 Further, where “majority rule frequently leads to a
contest between the two most popular positions, . . . consensus often
necessitates the integration of the position among all group members.”462
Interestingly, the Quaker method is aligned with some of the ancient
societies, discussed above, which valued consensus and found up/down
voting to be insulting.463
454

SHEERAN, supra note 448, at 49.
Molina-Markham, supra note 450, at 155.
456
SHEERAN, supra note 452, at 3, 48.
457
Id. at 48 (quoting PHILADELPHIA YEARLY MEETING, Faith and Practice
17-18 (1972)).
458
SHEERAN, supra note 452, at 51 (quoting BURTON R. CLARK, THE
DISTINCTIVE COLLEGE: ANTIOCH, REED, AND SWARTHMORE 51-52
(Chicago, Aldine 1970)
459
Id.
460
Brycchan, supra note 444 at 17 (explaining that it was through a
consensus process that the Quakers’ commitment to the abolition of slavery
(once a minority position) became a major tenet of their faith).
461
Lippard, supra note 444 at 152.
462
Molina-Markham, supra note 450, at 157-58.
463
See supra notes 177-183 and surrounding text.
455
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Listening and silence are important hallmarks of Quaker rhetoric.464
Instead of a persuasive speech that a talented individual delivers while an
audience listens, for Quakers, the highest form of communication originates
in silence.465 Every Sunday, Quakers worship by sitting for an hour in
silence.466 The silence is punctuated occasionally when a participant stands
up and speaks, if they believe they have received a message from the Light
worth sharing with the group.467 To make decisions related to the
congregation, Quakers similarly deploy silence to find the sense of the
meeting, which the clerk (secretary) then records.468
Contrary to how we intuitively think about speech from a Western
standpoint, silence is not the opposite or even the absence of speech; it is a
“deeply meaningful communicative event that can be analyzed in its own
terms as actively achieved.”469 William Penn stated, “True silence is the rest
of the mind; and is to the spirit, what sleep is to the body, nourishment, and
refreshment.”470 Silence also elevates the role of the listener, which is
refreshing in Western culture, which places the speaker in a heroic
position.471 In the Quaker communication process, it is the group, sitting
together and listening in silence, that is responsible for the conclusion, the
message, and the outcome.472 In this way, Quaker rhetoric expands
communication from being a dialogue between the speaker and the audience
to a group experience that enables a spiritual experience that could not be
achieved in individuals acting alone.473
The process of finding the sense of the meeting creates meaning in a
way that is both participatory and communitarian.474 The process offers
possibilities for community building because everyone, even those who
disagree, are included in the sense of the meeting.475 Any individual
464

SHEERAN, supra note 452, at 49.
Lippard, supra note 444 at 147.
466
Molina-Markham, supra note 450, at 159.
467
Id.
468
Id. at 161, 170.
469
Id. at 171.
470
WILLIAM PENN, WORKS 325 (1774) (quoted in Lippard, supra note 444
at 147).
471
Id. at 155.
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Id. at 157.
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Lippard, supra note 444, at 150.
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Molina-Markham, supra note 450, at 157.
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Id. at 171; Lippard, supra note 444, at 152.
465

75
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3786244

perspective, no matter how limited, is listened to and given voice.476 Thus,
when a decision has been reached, it is not a yes/no, up/down message;
instead, it reads as a “generally yes, but there are concerns” message,
allowing those in the minority to be included in the continuing discussions.477
For law, Quaker rhetoric offers a potentially tool that is not often utilized.
There are situations where seeking consensus out of silence could locate
solutions that may not be visible in the adversarial legal system.
ii.

Restorative Rhetoric

Another form of micro-rhetoric can be found in processes designed to
bring healing from harm and trauma yet which do not contain a strong
retributive remedy (such as punishment or incarceration). Retributive
criminal justice refers to a remedy that is “intended to satisfy the
community’s retaliatory sense of indignation that is provoked by the [crime
or] injustice.”478 Restorative justice is focused on restoring what was lost to
the victim as well as restoring the offender to the status of law abiding
citizen.479 This part of the paper looks at what rhetoric lessons might be
learned from two restorative justice procedures: (1) truth and reconciliation
hearings and (2) repentance ritual ceremonies. Starting in the 1970s, truth
and reconciliation commissions were formed by governments so that the
members of the public could voice their experiences with atrocities
committed during a state’s previous administration.480 Repentance or
reintegration ceremonies represent an indigenous form of criminal justice
where a criminal offender and his/her family stand with the victims’ family
to reach closure and healing.481 Both of these processes are communicative
events that engage with a desire to find closure and healing after harmful,
maleficent, and traumatic events. They do so, however, without the
traditional retributive remedies of punishment and incarceration. In this way,
these processes are referred to as restorative rather than retributive.482
476

Lippard, supra note 444, at 152.
Id. at 152.
478
PUNISHMENT, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
479
Albert W. Dzur, Restorative Justice and Civic Accountability for
Punishment, 36 POLITY 3, 5 (2003).
480
TERESA GODWIN PHELPS, SHATTERED VOICES: LANGUAGE, VIOLENCE,
AND THE WORK OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 77-78 (Univ. of Penn Press 2006).
481
John Braithwaite, Survey Article: Repentance Rituals and Restorative
Justice, 8 J. POL. PHIL. 115 (2000).
482
See Jonathan Allen, Between Retribution and Restoration: Justice and
the TRC, 20 S. AFR. J. PHIL. 22, 25 (2001) (referring to South Africa’s Truth
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76
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3786244

Truth and reconciliation commissions were established in the later
part of the 20th century to deal with atrocious human rights violations
committed during a previous state regime.483 Prominent examples include
Argentina’s Nunca Más commission, a national commission constituted in
1983 to address thousands of “disappeared” victims during Argentina’s prior
military dictatorship,484 and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, organized to address the murderous violence of its apartheid
regime.485 Instead of a full-blown Nuremburg style trial to convict and punish
all the wrongdoers, these states held restorative rather than retributive
proceedings because the new leadership doubted the new state could survive
if full retribution for the past occurred.486 Accordingly, states sanctioned truth
and reconciliation proceedings in order to introduce “those unjustly excluded
from legal recognition into the realm of civic respect.”487 Instead of
prosecution and punishment, the goal was to collect and record narratives of
what happened.488 Victims did not get retribution in an official sense; instead,
the process was designed to produce what Archbishop Desmond Tutu
referred to as ubuntu, or humaneness.489 Offenders who would have been
punished in a retributive setting received amnesty, but only if they attended
the hearings, listened, and fully disclosed all facts in their knowledge.490
Because of its emphasis on process, one hallmark of restorative
rhetoric is an emphasis on listening to the victim’s voice. Professor Teresa
Godwin Phelps’s incisive book, Shattered Voices: Language, Violence, and
the World of Truth Commissions, illuminates the restorative rhetoric that
occurs in a truth commission setting. The rhetorical focus is on the victim,
who takes back the power to “use language for themselves and to shape for
themselves the chaos of their experiences of violence into their own coherent
stories.”491
and Reconciliation Commission as following a restorative justice model);
Braithwaite, supra note 481, at 115 (defining restorative justice as a process
where all parties who have been affected by an offense come together to
heal from the offense).
483
Id. at 22-23; PHELPS, supra note 480, at 77, 78.
484
PHELPS, supra note 480, at 82-87.
485
Id. at 104-105.
486
Allen, supra note 482, at 22-23.
487
Id. at 29.
488
PHELPS, supra note 480, at 75, 78-79.
489
Allen, supra note 482, at 25.
490
Id. at 25.
491
PHELPS, supra note 480, at 90.
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The South African proceedings began with lighting a white candle,
reminding all that the process was both sanctioned by the state, but also
imbued with a sense of the sacred.492 Because the focus was on the speaker,
who determined what to say and how to say it, truth and reconciliation
proceedings have been described as “polyphonic and uncensored,” a diversity
of voice that “oppose[d] all that threatens to be authoritarian.”493 Victims
were permitted to “ramble, cry, and scream.”494 Audiences were expected to
listen.
The non-linear and impromptu nature of the truth and reconciliation
narratives functioned rhetorically to dethrone the previous regimes, which
thrived on censorship and tightly controlled stories.495 The victim also
received fulfilment from telling his/her story, one of humankind’s most deepseated desires. 496 Because telling or re-telling a story of harm can be
therapeutic for trauma victims, the process was also therapeutic.497 “The
storyteller move[d] from passive victimization to being a morally responsible
agent capable of choosing the shape of the narrative in which he or she [was]
cast.”498 Finally, in a truth and reconciliation hearing, the sacred––usually
buried within the law––surfaces as the deep-seated human desire for
vengeance (retributive) powerfully transmutes into language and narrative.
In contemporary law, dispassionateness and order are imbued into civil
procedure and legal rhetoric. The restorative rhetoric within truth
commissions contain lessons on when free-form storytelling might be an
appropriate means to achieve healing, if retribution is not possible.
Truth and reconciliation proceedings try to find a balance between
retribution and healing.499 Allowing victims to name their oppressors and
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Id. at 12, 25, 70, 108-09; see also Peter Goodrich, Justice and the
Trauma of Law: A Response to George Pavlich, 18 STUD. L. POL. SOC’Y
271, 271-272 (1998) (tracing the spiritual and sacred connections within
contemporary understandings of justice).
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PHELPS, supra note 480, at 90.
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PHELPS, supra note 480, at 58 (Quoting/citing HAYDEN WHITE, THE
CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL
REPRESENTATION 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1987)).
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their suffering enables some form of non-violent retribution.500 However,
many of those participating did not feel that they received justice because the
wrongdoers, for the most part, escaped retributive punishment.501 When
retributive punishment is not allowed, the primeval desire for a vengeance
erupts. This occurred during a South African truth and reconciliation
proceeding when the mother of a youth killed by South African police threw
her shoe at the police officer who may have killed her son.502 The shoethrowing incident can be viewed as positive aspect of the truth and
reconciliation process—the mother was able to voice her anger and grief in a
truth and reconciliation proceeding where a traditional trial setting would
deny her that voice.503
On the other hand, the shoe throwing incident could represent a
limitation on restorative rhetoric. When violent and oppressive powerrelations have been maintained for years, the need to enact punitive retaliation
with state sanctioned violence should perhaps not be denied. Punishment of
the previously powerful might be the best “way of defeating the offender’s
claim to superiority. . .[;] It actually masters the perpetrator in a manner
comparable to the way that he mastered the victim and therefore signals the
refutation of his claim to mastery.”504 Especially where the powerful have
arbitrarily sought retribution, it does not do justice to deny that remedy to
those who have borne the brunt of unjust notions of punishment and crime.
In the U.S., retribution is one of the most important policy goals in
criminal law.505 In addition to an “eye-for-an-eye” retaliatory vengeance,506
retribution also houses the emotion of shame.507 After a crime has been
500
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committed, those affected need to be able to communicate with the offender
and explain the harmful consequences of his/her actions.508 Not all shaming
is bad, however. In writing about restorative forms of indigenous justice, John
Braithwaite distinguishes good shame from bad shame. Bad shame is the
type of shame that is often inflicted on an offender in a harsh retributive
regime. Psychologically harmful shame is the kind where there is no
reprieve; the offender is made to “feel completely worthless and degraded
from head to foot.”509 Psychologist James Gilligan identifies this kind of
shame as “the primary and ultimate cause of all violence, whether toward
others or toward the self.”510 Harmful shame can cause a person to withdraw
from the community, to self-medicate through alcohol and substance abuse,
and to repeat the behavior that triggered the shame in the first place.511 The
shame experienced in a harshly retributive system, where there is no way to
re-enter the community that cares for the offender, produces a shame-rage
spiral, when then leads to more violence.512
Legal scholars have identified indigenous repentance rituals as a
method of engaging with a more positive form of shame, a kind of shame that
communicates the harm caused by the offender, but does so with the ultimate
goal of having the offender come back into the community (rather than being
banished to a years-long sentence of incarceration).513 A repentance ritual
facilitates good shame because it “treats the person as a good person who has
done a bad thing” and contains a truly restorative conclusion––the ceremony
concludes with repentance and forgiveness.514 In the Maori (New Zealand)
justice tradition, a repentance ceremony emphasizes the victim’s voice. There
is a facilitator whose job is to encourage the conversation, but intervene if
any one person’s speech becomes too dominating.515 The shaming is not
forced––it occurs through a natural dialogue as the victim and his/her
supporters describe the consequences of the crime on himself/herself and her
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family.516 A repentance ritual is also not individualistic. The offender stands
together with his family, who bears the shame with him/her.517 Even when
the offender is shameless, his/her mother might carry the shame of the act,
even breaking down and sobbing upon hearing about her child’s behavior.518
In terms of culpability, there is a causal approach (most similar to a
Western approach of evaluating the elements of the crime), but there is also
a reactive approach, which looks at the offender’s marginal responsibility for
the crime and his/her reaction to it.519 In terms of assessing guilt or innocence,
the offender may decline to assert innocence but also decline to admit guilt.520
There is less emphasis on proving culpability and more emphasis on the
offender’s responsibility for the harm done.
In the Maori repentance ceremony, after the victim and her supporters
have spoken, the offender has a chance to apologize, which he/she often does,
without being asked to do so.521 In the ensuing dialogue, the victim is often
prone to forgive.522 Then, there is a break and the victim’s family formulates
a plan to restore the victim and the community.523 Restorative actions might
include an apology, reparation (emotional and monetary), community
restoration (community service work), and re-assurances that there won’t be
a re-occurrence.524 In the end, the offender returns to a community of care
that welcomes him/her back.525
Restorative justice produces a type of process-based rhetoric that has
many commonalities with what has already been discussed in this article. It
516
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is not hierarchical, it is not adversarial, it does not focus on proving fault or
culpability. The speaker is usually the victim (or someone speaking on his/her
behalf). As illustrated in the South African truth and reconciliation
proceedings, the speech is not planned or organized, but allowed to run freely
and full of emotion.526 Questions about guilt, severity of the crime, or
appropriate punishment are not answered through one individual’s advocacy
(as would be the case with a prosecutor); rather, these questions are answered
collectively, though a conversation conducted by community members. On
this point, the most challenging paradigm shift to deal with is that rhetoric is
not a heroic enterprise conducted individually.527 Instead, restorative rhetoric
is borne out of a polyphonic dialogue of many voices. Rhetorical merit is not
awarded based on individual performance. If at all, merit is allocated based
on one’s ability to ignite a healing conversation and keep it going. Merit is
adjudged based on one’s ability to engage with ties in the community. For
lawyers trained on the rhetor as heroic author model, this requires some
rethinking.
If restorative rhetoric can repair wicked and intractable problems,
what types of rhetoric might work to heal and repair the U.S.’s unvoiced
history of human rights violations––in particular, the grievous harm done to
indigenous people and the enslaved? A retributive rhetoric, where a
prosecutor holds up an offender for shame and punishment, is not that
different from what is voiced at a truth and reconciliation commission. In
both systems, the victim is humanized, her story is told, and her suffering is
made visible.528 Retributive rhetoric deployed in a restorative process could
allow victims to feel some amount of vindication, but they would not be able
to punish. Because the racial harms wrought by white supremacy in this
country include repeated instances of maiming, dismemberment, lynchings,
and other acts of genocide, it is unclear whether restoration without
retribution or monetary reparation can ever lead to true healing. In a
restorative system, the rhetoric could spotlight the harm and hold the offender
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up for shame, but such a process side-steps the human desire, eminently
reasonable, to retaliate against those who have wronged them.
Admittedly, this part of my paper raises more questions than answers,
especially when we add prison abolition, which jettisons retributive theories
of punishment altogether, into the mix.529 One conclusion, however, is that
any attempt to create reparations or restoration for racial injustice that does
not consider the deep-seated human need for retribution and vengeance will
likely fail. Of course, some restorative systems utilize punishment, just a
more reflective, deliberative, and democratic style of punishment.530 There is
likely a middle ground here, a restorative rhetoric that embraces the need to
shame the offender and the need to witness punishment. This kind of
restorative process could break the cycle of racial harm this country has
experienced and is still experiencing.
The other observation is that our criminal and civil justice systems are
overly carceral, racially unbalanced, with massive access to justice inequities
on the civil and criminal sides. The system is not working. It is unlikely that
restorative justice procedures will ever supplant the entire legal system. As
a micro-rhetoric, however, restorative rhetoric can be deployed in certain
legal pockets. For instance, a secular repentance ritual could, for instance, be
used in juvenile justice cases, criminal misdemeanor cases, or for other nonviolent offenses. Orienting criminal justice around an ethic of care and a
community of care could transform and heal some of the most broken aspects
of our legal system.
iii.

Citizen’s Rhetoric

Citizen’s rhetoric531 (like many of the rhetorics studied in this paper)
is participatory and emphasizes horizontality and community support over a
top-down approach to speaking. One type of citizen’s rhetoric can be found
in anarchist communities. Anarchists believe that society should organize
itself cooperatively and voluntarily, without the machinery of a coercive
state.532 With a long history as an underground mode of the thought,
529
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anarchism surfaced in U.S. culture during Occupy Wall Street and it reemerged in the summer of 2020, as communities sought state-less
alternatives in response to the continuous stream of state-sanctioned police
killings of black and brown people. Anarchist movements have been
described as pre-figurative; the movement tries to create a structure that
eschews alienation nor exploitation, prefiguring the new transformed
society it hopes to create.533 Seattle’s Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone is one
such example of an anarchist enclave where people gathered together to
provide food, medical care, education, art, and childcare, without the
intervention of the state.534 In Seattle, the anarchists were reviled for trying
to imagining and building a society where people, not individual leaders,
are in control.535 The mainstream press was quick to gloat when the attempt
to build a utopia in the middle of a vast dystopia failed.536
Anarchist rhetoric emphasizes horizontal principles, meaning that no
one person holds a sway when speaking, and everyone is given a voice. In a
meeting, the stack is the list of people ready to speak.537 Sometimes a
“progressive” stack is used, in which case, marginalized group members are
allowed to speak first.538 Perhaps the best symbol of anarchist rhetoric is the
“people’s mic.” When the people’s mic is in use, the person speaking
pauses after each phrase and the people nearby repeat it in unison.539 In this
way, “[t]he people’s mic can give the speaker a sense of power, and for
those playing the role of the mic amplifying a speaker’s voice, the call and
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response is physically energizing and provides a strong sense of
participation.”540
Beyond anarchist enclaves, citizen’s rhetoric can be found in other
participatory fora, such as the citizen’s assemblies and cooperatives in
Jackson, Mississippi, where Mayors Chokwe Lumumba and his son
Chokwe Antar Lumumba (both attorneys) created multiple opportunities for
participatory democracy.541 In this pluriverse, the polyphonic voice of the
people is the driving force; there is no unitary narrative that offers up a
solution for the problems being discussed.542 For Westerners trained to find
the grand narrative that will solve all the things, accepting the pluriverse is a
challenge. But there is hope that these micro-rhetoric bubbles might
multiply, congeal together in some fashion, and remake the world into
something different.
In order to facilitate citizen’s rhetoric, the rhetor must be willing to
build community and allow the spotlight to shine on all those in attendance,
not just the one person at the podium. Personal glory is not the goal of a
leadership style that emphasizes horizontality. It is difficult, but not
impossible, to envision a citizen’s rhetoric gaining ground in our top-down
society obsessed with competition and winning. Nonetheless, it has
flourished in a few corners. Professor Natsu Taylor Saito has compellingly
written that even if the majoritarian state is not ideal, “sub-state forms of
governance can be just as influential as state government.”543 Different
people and groups have long shared land within a territory and human
society has long been organized in different ways, before the advent of the
modern state.544 Saito’s sub-state concept is helpful for imagining the role
of transformative micro-rhetorics. Alternative forms of rhetoric can
influence and shape outcomes even if they do not become accepted in a
majoritarian way.
For lawyers trained in traditional legal rhetoric, the people’s mic
offers a refreshing take on communication. Instead of arguing at the
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podium or in front of a jury, the argument takes on the voice of a chorus,
where all are engaged in the speech. In law school, what if we had a moot
court experience that used alternative rhetorics to create meanings and
community, as a method to build new ways of making legal arguments?545
CONCLUSION
Comparative legal rhetoric contains a trove of knowledge that can
be used to improve communication, enhance persuasion, and envision new
forms of community building. Learning how other cultures solve legal
problems generates new ideas that might be infused into the traditional legal
system. Categorizing rhetoric into micro-rhetorics is helpful because it
allows us to see how alternative rhetorical strategies can be employed when
the overall system maintains deference to traditional argumentative forms.
Studying comparative legal rhetoric, however, is particularly challenging
when other rhetoric forms depart from core tenets of Western rhetoric,
including individual authorship, the adversarial system, and logocentric
argument. Future inquiries that will surely spring from this paper include
lessons from rhetoric around the world that might augment our
understanding of human persuasion and help locate possible universalities
in how humans communicate. Rhetoric from other cultures might identify
effective persuasion techniques that have been overlooked in the West.
There is so much that comparative legal rhetoric can teach us if we
approach the topic with an open mind, a deep sense of humility, and an
awareness of how pre-existing power-relations relates to communication
forms.
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Please stay tuned, my colleagues Elizabeth Berenguer and Teri
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scenarios that ask students to use alternative rhetoric.
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